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"I think the time fir censorship is gone .... Forces of
technology, changing cultures, changing modes of
communication... This is a phenomenon that no
government or alliance of governments can block. This
is evolution and no one can stop evolution. '
INTR OD UCTION
Ten years ago, the social media site Facebook did not exist:
YouTube and Twitter did not enter the cultural consciousness
until 2005 and 2006, respectively.' These social media sites came
into the world and subsequently transformed it by allowing
people to connect with each other on an unprecedented level,
free of charge. 4
1. Rumors of a Facebook Block Persist in Egypt, MENASSAT, Aug. 29, 2008,
http:,/ww.cnassat.coii/?q-ei/conmmlent/reply/4508 (quoting Wad Nawara.
Egyptian blogger).
2. See Newsroon. FACEBOOK, http://newvsroom.b.com/cotntent/default aspxNews
Aicald-20 (last visited May 25, 2012) (tracing the history of Facebook).
3. See Nicholas Carlson, How Twitter Was Fourde, d BUS. INSIDER, Apr. 13, 2011,
http://ww, busincssinsider.coi/Iho-[wittCr-was-ftnded-2011-4 (discussing the
founding of Twitter); John Cloud, The YouTube Gurus. TIME, Dec. 25, 2006, at 66
(presenting the history olfYouTube).
4. See DANV1D KIRKIATRicK, THL FACEBOOK EFLCT 7-8 (2010) (providing examples
of how Facebook has changed the world); see also inf a Part 11 (describing how people
in diflerent countries have used social media to eflectuate change). While there are still
costs to connecting to the Internet, such as connection fees, there is no charge to join
social inedia Sites such as Facebook and Twitter. See Carlson, supra note 3; Newsroorn,
Supra note 2.
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Social media sites have transformed society on both a micro
and macro level by enabling perpetual communication.5 On the
micro level, individuals are able to keep track of their friends
and family on a daily basis. People can upload pictures, offer
commentary on a topic of their choice, or voyeuristically view
the activity of others. 7 With a single click, a person can receive
updates on a friend who is on the other side of the world.8 On
the macro level, social media has enabled mass gatherings,
helped to organized strikes, and facilitated revolutions around
the worldY
No one could have predicted the way the Internet
developed, spreading beyond borders to become an accepted
(and expected) reality of everyday life."' Early commentators
questioned how governments would respond to the spread of
the Internet and whether an international approach to internet
governance would develop. I The various laws of different
5. See jan IH. Kietzmann et al.. Social VMedia? Get Serious! L nderstandu g the
Fu"etioral Building Blocks of Social Wedia, 54 BUS. HORIZONS 241, 241 (2011)
(expounding the influence of social media in today's society); see also AARON SMITH ET
AL., PLW INTEILRNLT & A~d. LIFE PROJECT, THE INTERNET AND CIL ENGAGEMENT 5-7
(2009), , ailabl at http:i/pewviinternet.orgi/imediaiiFiles/Reportsi2(09/The%
20hlternt% 20and% 20( ivic% 20Engagement.pdf (positing that new torms of civic
engagement through social media sites may alter long-standing patterns).
6. See Kietzmann et al., supra note 5, at 242 (discussing the ways that social media
can be used); see also Newsroom, supra note 2 (providing information on the uses of
Faccbook).
7. See KIRKPATRICK, .,ra note 4, at 7-8 (discussing how people use Facebook); see
also Kietzinann et al., supa note 5, at 242 (describing the ways individuals use social
media).
8. See IRKPATRICK, sapra note 4, at 7-8 (providing examples of how social media
has aided in organizing movements); see also infra Part Ii (describing how people in
different countries have used social media to effectuate change).
9. See inra Part II (describing the role of social media in movements around the
world).
10. See, e.g., Steven M. Hanley, Intenational Internet Regulation: A iWultinational
Approach, 16 MARSHAII J. COMPUTER & INFO. 1. 997, 1012-13 (1998) (proposing an
approach that would allow different countries to exercise var)ing degrees of
regulation); Mark A. Lemlcy, The Law and Economics oflnternet Norms, 73 CHLI-KLNT L.
RPv. 1257, 1260 (1998) (arguing that it would be unrealistic to expect that the rules of
cybcrspacc could take over from existing laws); Timothy S. Wu, Cyberspace Soverein ty 2-
The Internet and the International Systemn, 10 I-LARN. J.L. & TILCH. 647, 658 (1997)
(assuming that international governments would be able to shape internet norms and
ignore those that did not benefit them).
11. See Hanley, supra note 10, at 1003-06 (presenting attempts at internet
regulation); Lemley, supra note 10, at 1266-84 (describing the problems with enforcing
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countries were seen as the major impediment towards
establishing a comprehensive system of internet governance. 12
This assumed, however, that internet control would remain a
viable option for governments. 13 While academics studying
internet regulation noted its status quo-altering potential, none
could predict how pervasive internet use (and dependence)
would become.1 4
Over time, internet norms and rules were established and
widely adopted, first by the engineering and technological
groups responsible for initial internet development, and later by
international organizations and governmental agencies. 5
Initially, internet experts pointed to different attitudes between
"founding" countries (e.g., the United States) and countries
that adopted the Internet later as a basis for why a governance
framework that relied on internationally accepted principles
and standards, such as transparency and privacy, would never
emerge.'1 According to this view, the national agenda would
always triumph if there were a clash between government
internet norms); Wu, supra note 10, at 648-49 (discussing the possible approaches to
an international system of internct governance).
12. See Hanley, supra note 10, at 1010 ("Foreseeable problems arise in entorcing
international laws enacted to regulate the Internet since countries hold vastly different
political and social values."). See generally John T. Delacourt, The International Impact of
Internet Regulation, 38 -ARv. INT' L J. 207 (1997) (illustrating the different legal
approaches taken by several countries in regulating the Internet).
13. See Hanley, supra note 10, at 1012-13 (discussing censorship as a possible
governmental approach to internet regulation); see also Dclacourt, supra note 12, at 208
(mentioning screening sofiware and rating systems as ways that states could regulate
the Internet).
14. See Amy Knoll, AnT Mhich l/Vay but Loose: Nations Regulate the Iteret. 4 TUL. J.
INT'I & (OMP. I. 275, 299 (1996) (" lit appears that most of the authorities in many of
the countries do not fully appreciate tihe global nature of the Internet."); see also
Lemilcy, supra note 10, at 1267-71 (claiming that the establishment of a collective
internet community would become impossible as the size of the group increases). See
generally Hanley, supra note 10 (failing to predict how ubiquitous internet use would
become).
15. See infra Part I I (tracing the development of internet norms).
16. See Wu, supra note 10, at 661 ("The attitudes of 'founding' countries like the
United States is profoundly diffe rent from that of countries for whom thre Internet is a
somewhat awlkward recent arrival."); see also Hanley, supra note 10, at 1013-18 (stating
that there is no intcrnational consensus and thus. "[o]ne rigid unitary solution to
international Internet regulation is impossible"): infia Part I.B.2 (discussing the norms
that have been adopted by international organizations).
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interests and internet norms.1 7 Consequently, a state would likely
respect norms that promoted the long-term interests of the state
and ignore the rest. 18 For example, a nation interested in
regulating all content that reaches its citizens would ignore the
accepted internet principles of freedom of expression and
transparency. 19 Consequently, an international system of
internet governance could never truly develop211
Contrary to this early view, there is now de facto governance
by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations
("NGOs"), corporations, and governmental agencies. 21
Historically, these groups have stressed privacy and freedom of
expression as key norms that should influence any legislation
that is adopted.2 2 The Internet has enabled the dissemination of
traditionally American notions of freedom of expression and
privacy to regions unfamiliar with these ideas.23 People around
the world have embraced these democratic concepts and
demanded change, and as a result, governments have had to
17. See Wu, supra note 10, at 665 ("[E]ven in the lace of a stUong individual
consensus that a certain Internet norm deserves recognition by nation states, certain
states mav nonetheless refuse to adopt the norm."); see also Hanley, supra note 10, at
1001 ("Thus, governments of all Internet using courntris are faced with a dilemma:
how to allow the fiee exchange of inforinmation while at the same tine prevent socially
unacceptable inlormation firom entering their country via the Internet.").
18. See Wu, supra note 10, at 658 ("Those norms for which cooperation seems to
facilitate the lhng-tern interests of the state will become the governing rule set of the
regime, while all others will simply be ignored."); see also )avid R. Johnson & David
Post, Law and Border-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. I RLV. 1367, 1390 (1996)
(predicting that territorial sovereigns would continue to assert jurisdiction and make
law about what happens online).
19. SeeWu, supa note 10, at 659-60 (naming Singapore as an example of a nation
that has ignored established internet norms in the interest of protecting its national
interests); see asoJohnson & Post, sopra note 18, at 1381-87 (discussing how sovereigns
continue to assert control over the Internet).
20. See Hanley, supra note 10, at 1016 ("One rigid unitary solution to international
Internet regulation is impossible."); see also Wu, sopra note 10. at 658-66 (describing
why an international system of internet governance could never succeed).
21. See infia Part 11 (explaining the power these groups have in guiding the
Internet's development and, consequently, in the way people view content): see also
Christopher S. Xoo. Free Speech and the Ath of the Internet as an r irtermediaed
Eperience, 78 GLO. W ASH. L. RLV. 697, 698-99 (2010) (describing the ways in which
different groups act as intermediaries in order to facilitate the internet experience).
22. See infra Parts 11 -11 (discussing the way in which internet norms emerged).
23. See infia Part ILA (recognizing that social media has allowed traditionally
Western ideals to spread to other regions such as Middle East).
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reassess their approach to internet regulation.24 The rise of
social media has shown that the Internet is truly a democratic
medium, and international governments have struggled to
respond to its continued growth and relevance2 Never before
has a generation been so tech-savvy.2 Governments, however,
have not yet determined their proper role in this new system27
Nations that experience a clash between the traditional
norms of the state and accepted internet norms have had a
more difficult time than those with similar principles. 2" For
example, Egypt does not have traditional notions of free speech
or privacy, and consequently, it was difficult for the state to
respond when Egyptians expected that these norms would be
respected on the Internet. 2 - Even so, more technologically
advanced countries such as the United Kingdom and the United
States also have experienced growing pains.-0 This Note argues
that going forward, governments should use established internet
norms and standards when making important legislation and
regulations. Rather than attempt to create an internet policy
based solely on the existing sovereign laws, which do not
account for technological realities, nations should aim to model
future legislation within their countries on existing internet
norms such as freedom of expression, transparency, and privacy.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the Internet and
social media. Specifically, it examines how norms were
established as the Internet's cultural pervasiveness soared. Part
L.A discusses the development of the Internet, using the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Egypt as case studies. Next,
24. See irfra Part 1I (identilying the problems governments have faced in t-ing to
conuol the Internet).
25. See irfra Part 1I (describing the issues that international governments have
faced as social media has grown).
26. See Kietzmnann et al., supra note 5, at 242 (describing the current state of
technology/ and its influence on society); see also KIRKPATRICK, supra note 4, at 6-8
(naming ways in which people are able to use social media).
27. See infra Part 11 (identiting the problems governments have faced when
attempting to regulate the Internet).
28. See, e.g., infra Part ILA (describing the Egyptian government's response to the
expectation that internet norms will be respected).
29. See irffa Part IILA (discussing the difIiculties the Eg 7ptian government has
faced as social media sites have become ubiquitous).
30. See nffra Part I.B-C (Setting forth [he issues that the United Kingdom and he
United States lace when attempting to regulate social media).
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Part I.B looks at how international organizations, engineering
groups, and governmental agencies have adopted particular
internet norms and standards. In particular, this Part looks at
freedom of expression and privacy as norms that have
historically guided regulation of the Internet. Part .B also
analyzes how governments have attempted to establish security
as a norm in order to rationalize state interference with social
media.
Part 11 then examines the governmental responses to social
media sites such as Facebook and Twitter in Egypt, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, and the recent clashes between
these governments and established internet norms. Specifically,
Part II.A traces the Egyptian revolution of early 2011. Part 11.B
discusses the UK riots of August 2011 and the recent
development of the "super-injunction," an injunction that
prevents news organizations from revealing the identities of
those involved in legal disputes or even reporting the fact that
restrictions have been imposed. , Finally, Part II.C looks at the
repercussions of San Francisco's shutdown of mobile service in
August 2011. Part II.C also examines the legal issues concerning
the collection and storage of personal data by authorities in the
United States and recent attempts to further restrict freedom of
expression on the Internet.
In Part 11, this Note argues that governments must respect
established internet norms such as freedom of expression and
privacy when attempting to regulate social media. Governmental
use of a security rationale is not persuasive, as freedom of speech
and privacy considerations have consistently trumped security
concerns since the dawn of the Internet, especially in the
American context. While the rise of social media may have
amplified security concerns, the US government should remain
true to its initial aspirations when formulating policy. This Note
concludes that rather than taking steps to regulate social media
as security threats arise, governments should instead look to
internet norms such as openness, transparency, access, freedom
31. See James Robinson, How Super/qUjunctions Are Used to Gag Irvestigative
Reporting. GAIALAN (U.K), Oct. 13, 2009, at 6 (describing the creation of super-
injunctions): Ravi SoLmaiya, British Law Used to Shush Scandal Has Become One, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2011, at A4 (summarizing the elements of a super-injunction).
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of expression, and privacy when determining social media
policy.
1. THE GROWTH OF THE IANTERNET AND THE
DENVELOPMENT OF NORMS AS A MEANS OF IN TE[RA1ET
GOI VERNANCE
The development of the Internet resulted in the emergence
of standards and norms relating to internet governance. ,3 2 These
standards and norms were subsequently adopted
internationally. In order to understand how these norms
emerged, it is first necessary to examine the evolution of the
Internet. This Part traces the growth of the Internet and the
competing technological norms that were adopted and
implemented by governing organizations. Part L.A discusses the
evolution of the Internet. Specifically, Part LA examines the
initial development of the Internet and attempts at regulation in
the United States. Next, it tracks the growth of the Internet in
other developed countries, such as the United Kingdom. Finally,
Part LA describes the spread of the Internet to the rest of the
world, using Egypt as an example.
Next, Part I.B discusses how international organizations,
engineering groups, and governmental agencies have adopted
norms and standards. Specifically, this Part describes how
freedom of expression and privacy are norms that have
historically guided internet regulation. Part LB also analyzes
32. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECNo'MiC CO-OPERATION ANf) I)VFELOPMENT,
OECI) GUIDELINES ON THL PROTLCTION OF IRIWACY ANT) TRANSBORDFR FLOWS OF
IERSONAL DATA (1980), http:i/www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3746,en-2649-34255-
1815186 1 1 1 1.00&&en-USS 011)B(html [hereinafter OECD] (listing basic
principles of data protection); INTLRNET SOC'Y, EUROPEAN COMMISSION: PUBLIC
CONSI TATION ON THE OPEN INTERNET AND NLT NLUTRALITY (2010), available at
http://ww.isoc.org/pubpolpillar/Idocs/20100929_eu.pdf (describing the norms of
openness and transparency as vital internet standards).
33. S., Letter irom Sally Shipman Wentworh, Rcg'l Manager, N. Am., Internet
Soc'y, to the Hon. Julius Genachowksi, Chairman, Fed. Cormc'ns Conm'n (Jan. 14,
2010), a ailabte a http:i/www.isoc.org/pubpolpillar/Idocs/fcc20100114.pdf (using
internet norms and standards to validate preservation of the open Internet); see also
World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva 2003-Tunis 2005, Rep orn the
11Worlkig Grop on Internet Governarce, 6-7, WSIS-11/P(-3/DO(/5-E (Aug. 3, 2005)
(recommending the adoption of accepted intrneL norims and standards when trying to
establish a system of internct governance).
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how international governments have begun to use security
concerns as a rationale for interfering with social media.
A. The Development and Expansion of the Internet
1. The Invention of the Internet: The United States
In the 1960s and 1970s, the US Department of Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency ("ARPA") designed an
experimental computer network called ARPAnet.34 This network
linked computers at universities and research institutions in the
United States and in several countries that were members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO").15 In the 1980s,
the US Department of Defense adopted the Transmission
Control Protocolinternet Protocol as ARPAnet's system of
digital message formats and rules.? The TCPiP protocol was a
key architectural construct that introduced gateways to handle
disparities between networks and allowed for reliable
communications between them. 37 The Internet Engineering
Task Force was called upon to refine and extend these protocols
and continues to do so today. 8 In the early 1990s, Congress
34. See ROBERT E. KAHN & VINTON . CERF, WHAT IS THE INTERNET (AND WHAT
MAKES IT WORK)? (1999) ieprnted in OPLN ARCHITECTURL As COMMUNICATIONS
POT ICY 17, 21 (Mark N. Cooper ed., 2004) (discussing the creation of ARPAnet); see also
Knoll, supra note 14, at 276 ("In 1969 the United States Department of Defense (DoD)
designed an experimental computer network. the ARPAnct."). The Advanced Research
Pro ects Agency ("ARPA") is an agency responsible for the development of new
technology for use by the military. Our Vork, DEF. ADT' ANCET) RES. PROJECTS AGENCT,
http://ww.darpa.mil/otrwork/ (last visited May 25, 2012).
35. See I"HN & CERF, Supra note 34, at 21 (describing the way ARPAnet, worked);
see also Knoll, supra note 14, at 276 ("Gradually, universities hiroughout the United
States were linked to this web of computers, mostly in the math and sciences
departments.").
36. See K-AHN & CERF, sopra note 34, at 23 (discussing the establishment of the
TCP/IP protocol); see also CHARLES L. HEDRic, RUTGERLS UNIV., INTRODUCTION TO
THE INTERNET PROTOCOLS (1987), available at http://iwWT.ic.eduidepts/accc/
nc/work/ftp/v452.hunl (presenting an introduction to the T(P/IP protocol suite).
37. See K l-N & (ERE, supra note 34, at 23 (discussing the adoption of the TCP/IP
protocol suite); see also ED KROI, THE HITCHHIKER'S (UIDE TO THE INTERNET 2 (1987)
("As local area networks became more pervasive, many hosts became gateways to local
networks. A network layer to allow the interoperation of these networks was developed
and called Internet Protocol (|P)).
38. See KAHN & (ERI, supra note 34, at 24 (Stating the responsibilities of the
Internet Engincering Task Force): see also Olivier Sylvain, Internet Governance and
Democratic Leg/timnac, 62 FED. ONiM. I.J. 205, 212 (2010) (describing the Internet
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passed the Scientific and Advanced Technology Act of 1992,
legislation that allowed organizations to connect to the Internet
to conduct commercial activities. " This allowed for the
privatization of the Internet and resulted in its extensive
development. 40
While the strong protections of the US Constitution and
the Bill of Rights have resulted in very little government-
mandated filtering or censorship, the Internet became highly
regulated as it expanded and developed in the United States. 41
Government agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") and the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") were tasked with regulating certain areas of the
Internet. 42 There continues to be debate over content regulation
on the Internet concerning a wide range of topics such as
gambling, cyber security, and dangers to children.43 Many of the
Engineering Task Force ("IETF") as "the preeminent technical standard-setting
organization for the industr" ) .
39. See Scientific and Advanced Technology Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 1862(g)
(2006); see also KAHN & CERF, sopra note 36, at 26 (describing legislation allowing fir
coniercial activity on the Internet).
40. See AHN & CERIF, supr note 34, at 26 (mentioning the consequences of
legislation allowing comrnmercial activitv on the Internet); see alsojay p. Kesan & Rajiv C.
Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You-fool Us Twice Shame on Us: What We Can Learfn Jom the
Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U.
I.Q. 89, 111-14 (2001) (discussing the privatization of the Internet).
41. See John Sona et al.. Bit-Wise but Privacy Foolish: Smarter E-JIessagirg
Technologies Call for a Return to Core Privacy Principles, 20 ALB. L:J. Sc. & TECH. 487, 491
(2010) (explaining how dilferent agencies regulate internet communications issues):
see also Mark A. Lemnley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Pee.rng the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, in OPEN ARCHITECTURE AS
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY, sopra note 34, at 41, 42 (describing internet regulation).
42. See Soma et al., supra note 41, at 491 (stating that both the Federal
Conimunications Comnission ("FCC ) and Federal Trade Coimmission ("FT(C")
regulate internet and online comnunications issues); see also ILemley & Lessig, supra
note 41, at 42 (discussing the duties of the FCC and FTC). The FCC regulates interstate
and international coimmunicatios by radio, television. wire, satellite, and cable in all
fifty states, the District of Columbia, and US territories. See What 11e Do, FED. COMM.
CnMM1SSR)N, http:/iwwi.fcc.goviwhat-we-do (last visited May 25, 2012). The FTC's
nission is to prevent business practices that are anticomptitive. deceptive, or unlair to
consumers and to enhance informed consumer choice and public understanding of
the competitive process without unduly burdening legitiniatc business activity. About the
Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://w.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtin
(last visited May 25, 2012).
43. See United States and Canada Overview, OPENNLT 1NITIAITIT, 370,
hLtp:/t/openneL.nC[/stes/opclllc[.nt/fllcs/ONIUnitdSutatesand( anada_2010 .pdf
(last visited May 25, 2012) (describing the areas where there continues to be debate
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ongoing issues concern the First and Fourth Amendments of the
US Constitution.
The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." '44 In
essence, the US government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, ideas, subject matter, or content.45
Nevertheless, the protections of the First Amendment are not
absolute.46 The US Supreme Court has often recognized that
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations may be
necessary to further significant governmental interests. 47 These
restrictions may be valid so long as they are not based on the
content or subject matter of the regulated speech, serve a
significant governmental interest, and "leave open ample
alternative channels of communication. ' 4s
On the other hand, according to US law, restrictions that
are content-based must be narrowly tailored and serve a
over the proper role of government in internet regulation); se also )anielle Keats
Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fosteun g Digital Citizenship for
Our lJormation Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1438-40 (2011) (exploring dilferent ways to
regulate content on the Internet).
44. U.S. CONST. anend. I.
45. See Police L)ep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (holding that a city
ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 150 feet of a school, except peaceful
picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute, was unconstitutional because it
made an impermissible distinction between peacefiul labor picketing and other
peaceful picketing, thereby restricting expression based on its message).
46. See id. at 98 (recognizing that reasonable time, place, and manner regulations
of picketing may be necessary to flurther significant governmental interests).
47. See, e.g., id. at 98; Hefthon v. Int'l Soc'y for Klashna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640. 645-46 (1981) (holding that a statCs interest in maintaining orderly
movement of crowd at a fair wvas sufficient to justify requirements); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 119 (1972) (allowing an antinoise ordinance aimed at
preventing interference with nearby schools); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569.
576 (1941) (linding a permit that lixed the time and place of a parade permissible
because it served to prevent confusion by overlapping parades or processions, to secure
convenient use of tihe streets by other travelers, and to minimize the risk of disorder).
48. Heffon, 452 U.S. at 647-48 ("We have olten approved restrictions of that kind
provided that they arc justificd without reference to the Content of the regulated
speech, [hit they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in doing so they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.").
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compelling state interest. 49 Consequently, many government-
mandated attempts to regulate content have been banned on
First Amendment grounds, often after lengthy legal battles.51
The first wave of regulatory actions against sexually explicit
material on the Internet came in the 1990s. 51 The
Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA"), for example,
was designed to criminalize the transmission and display of
patently offensive content and communications to minors.5
This law was repealed in parts by the US Supreme Court in Reno
v. ACLUbecause it was not narrowly tailored.5-
Other sections of the CDA continue to remain in force,
including Section 230, which grants internet service providers
("ISPs") immunity from liability arising from content that users
place online and from requirements to remove offensive
speech. 54 The First Amendment protects speech only from
governmental restriction and thus does not govern private
actors' decisions to remove or filter online expression. 55
49. Id. at 662-63 (holding that the restriction wvas not narrowly drawn to advance
the state's interests and thereiore was unconstitutional).
50. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down parts of the
Communications )ecency Act ("CDA") for violating the liee speech provision of the
First Amendment); see also United States and Canada Overview. supra note 43 (discussing
Reno, 521 U.S. at 844. and its afterimath).
51. See, e.g., Communications I)ecency Act of 1996, Pub. I No. 104-104, 110 Stat.
133 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006)); see also United States and Canada
Overiew. supra note 43 (providing background on regulatory action taken in the
United States).
52. 47 U.S.C. § 223; see also , rited S ates and Canada Overview, supra note 43
(discussing the CDA).
53. Reno, 521 U.S. at 846. Congress has made two narrower attempts to regulate
children's exposure to internet indecency since the Supreme Court overturned parts of
thc (omnmunications Decency Act ("(DA"). The US Supreme Court overturned the
first, the Child Online Protection Act, for being vague and not narrowly tailored. See
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 585-86 (2004). 'While legal challenges also tollowed
tht Child Online Protection Act's successor, the (hildiren's Internet Protection Act of
2000, the Supreme Court upheld it as constitutional. See United States v. Am. Library
Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194. 214 (2003).
54. 47 U.S.C. § 230: see Citron & Norton, supra note 43. at 1453 (analyzing the
importance of Section 230 of the CDA).
55. See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 631 (D. Del. 2007); see also
C iron & Norton, supra note 43. at 1453 (explaining how private actors have the power
to ilter online expression).
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Intermediaries therefore enjoy wide latitude to make many
decisions regarding content.6
Regulation of the Internet also has raised Fourth
Amendment concerns.57 The Fourth Amendment of the US
Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.5s
As technological advancements have created new legal concerns,
the Fourth Amendment has become a source of challenges to
existing legislation.59
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), as
enacted into law, governs electronic communications, including
e-mail and other types of electronic messaging. 6 Congress
enacted the ECPA in 1986 to extend government restrictions on
wiretaps from telephone calls to include transmissions of
electronic data by a computer.uI The ECPA also contains the
Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), which addresses
56. See Citron & Norton, supra note 43, at 1453-54 (discussing the importance of
CDA Section 230 in allowing private actors to regulate online expression); Yoo, supra
note 21, at 697-702 (expounding way in which intermediaries make decisions
regarding internet content).
57. See, e.g., Julia Angwin, Secret Orders Target Email Wikileaks Backers Information
Sought, WALL ST.J., Oct. 10, 2011, at Al (describing secret court orders made by the US
government for personal information); Miguel Helft & Claire Cain Miller, Web Outruns
Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMLS. Jan. 10, 2011, at A1 (addressing Fourth Amendment concerns
regarding the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA")).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010) (addressing
individuals' right to privacy in e-mail); see also I)avid Kravets, Justice Dept. o Congress:
Don't Saddle 4th Amedment on Us, WIRED (Apr. 7, 2011, 4:06 PM),
http://ww,.wired.com /threatievel/2011/4/touirlh-amendmencL--mail-2/ (discussing
the privacy issues of the ECPA).
60. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
61. E, r ,i Commanicatons Privacy Act: Hearing Bfore the Sibcomr. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Admin. offJustice of the H. Comm. of thejudician on H.R. 3378, 99th
Cong. 3 (1986) (Statement of Sen. Patrick A. Leahy) (explaining the reasons for
enacting the ECPA).
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disclosure of stored communications held by third-party ISPs.6 -
There are questions as to whether the ECPA (and more
specifically, the SCA) violates the Fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable search and seizures.63
According to the ECPA, government officials do not need a
warrant to read e-mail messages that are older than 180 days.64
At the time the law was enacted, most e-mail was stored on a
person's hard drive, and e-mail stored on a third-party server for
more than six months was considered abandoned. 5 Recent
technological developments (most notably, the practice of
storing e-mail in the "cloud" rather than on a person's hard
drive) have led many to believe the law is severely outdated and
in need of revision.6
The ECPA also allows the government to compel disclosure
of electronic records help by third-party ISPs.67 Effectively, this
provision allows government agents to monitor electronic
communications systems for various reasons without a warrant.(8
For example, the US government has issued orders forcing
Google and several other ISPs to turn over information from e-
mail accounts. 9 Law enforcement regularly analyzes
62. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. I No. 99-508, §§ 201-
202, 100 Star. 1848, 1860 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006)).
63. See Helft & Miller, supra note 57, at AI (discussing the problems that have
resulted as tie ECPA has become outdated); see also Kravets, supra note 59 (addressing
the privacy issues of the ECPA).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (a) (2006).
65. See Kravets, supra note 59 (comparing the current technological realities with
those at the tilie the bill was signed into law); .1. BLCKW ITH BURR, THL ELLCTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS PRiv Acy ACT OF 1986: PRINCIPI.ES FOR REFORM 7-8 (2010), available
at http://digitaldueprocess.org/files/DDPBuirrMemo.pdf (criticizing thre 180 day
distinction).
66. See Helft & Miller, supra note 57, at AI (discussing the need for new
regulations that would claril the law concerning legal wiretaps of various itcrnct
communications); see also Kravets, sup a note 59 ("A coalition of itcrnct service
providers and other groups .. has lobbied for an update to the law to treat both cloud-
and home-stoLred e-mail the same, and thus require a probable-cause warrant tor
access.").
67. 18 U.S.C. § 25 10(5) (2006).
68. Id.; see Soma et al., supra note 41, at 519-21 (analyzing the consequences of
the ECPA).
69. See Angwin, supra note 57, at AI (detailing a secret court order made by the
US governinlnt); Noam Cohen, Twitter Shines a Spotlight on Secret F.B.I. Subpoenas. N.Y.
TIMLS, Jan. 10. 2011. at B3 (discussing how government subpoenas tor information are
often kept secret firom the people being investigated).
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information available on social networks to identify criminals,
terrorists, and other threats.70
Courts have split on whether a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his or her e-mail. 7' Most recently, in
2010, the Sixth Circuit ruled in United States v. Warshak that a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his e-mails and
that the government violated the Fourth Amendment by
compelling an ISP to turn over e-mails without first obtaining a
warrant. 72 The court went so far to say that the SCA was
unconstitutional to the extent that it "purport [ed] to permit the
government to obtain such e-mails warrantlessly.' 73 The trend
appears to be towards giving e-mail content the same privacy
protections as postal mail or telephone conversations.7 4
Critics maintain that the ECPA should be changed to
reflect technological realities. 75 Increasingly, courts have been
moving to extend Fourth Amendment protection to electronic
communications, and it appears that the US Congress is
70. See )anielle Keats Citron, Falfiling Government 2 O's Promise with Robust Privacy
Protections. 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 822, 831 (2010) (explicating how the government
uses individuals' social-media inforulation): see also, e.g., Angwin, supra note 57, at Al
(discussing a secret court order obtained by the US government against a man wvho
volunteered for Wikilcaks, the websitc that released classificd gover cimnt diplomatic
cables in 2011); Jim McKa, Cops on the Tweet to Solve Cries and Educate the Public, PLB.
(O (Aug. 31, 2009), http:/iwww.govtech.com/pcio Cops-on-dhe-Tweet-to-Solve. html
("Now there's an almost constarnt police presence on these sites: behind the scenes
where they may be quietly hunting sex offenders, or an upfhont approach by posting
videos and evidence to elicit public response that might help solve a crime.").
71. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 598 F.3d 1268, 1281 (1lth Cir. 2010) (finding that a
person does not have a reasonable cxpectation of privacy in an e-mail once any copy of
the communication is delivered to a third-party); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d
500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the privacy interests in e-mail are identical to
those in postal mail and that message contents in both may deseive Fourth
Amendment protection).
72. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010).
73. Id. at 288.
74. See, e.g, In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex.
2010) (ruling that the government must have a warrant when making requests for
records from cellular services); ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D.
Mich. 2006), redd and vacated on other g'rourds, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. dered,
128 S. Ct. 1334 (2008) (holding that the Terrorist Surveillance Program, a foreign
intelligence program that intercepted international telephone and internet
communications without a warrant, was unconstitutional). But see United States v.
Graham. CRIM. No. RDB- 11-0094. 2012 NVL 691531 (D. Md. Mar. 1, 2012).
75. See Helft & Miller, supra note 57, a A1 (criticizing the ECPA); 1\a avers, supa.
note 59 (noting the problems with the ECIPA).
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adopting a similar view. 76 The ECPA, Amendments Act, a
pending bill sponsored by chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) would contain
enhanced privacy protections, including a requirement that the
government obtain a search warrant for all electronic content.7
2. The Spread of the Internet: The United Kingdom
As internet use became more common around the world,
the debates in the United States over regulation and privacy
spread to other countries like the United Kingdom. As a NATO
member, the United Kingdom participated in the initial
establishment of ARPAnet. 7s Although the United Kingdom is a
constitutional monarchy without a written constitution, there is
legal protection for the freedom of expression, the protection of
reputation, and the right to privacy. 79 Additionally, the United
Kingdom's Human Rights Act of 1998 provides for limited
incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights
76. See Press Release, Sen. Patrick ILeahy, ILeahy Introduces Benchmark Bill to
Update Key Digital Privacy Law (May 17, 2011), available at http://lCahy.sCnate.goV/
press/press-releases/release/?id-b6dlf687-ft2f-48a4-80bc-29 e3c5t7 5 8 2 ("Updating
this law to reflect the realities of our time is essential to ensuring that our federal
privacy laws keep pace with new technologies and the new threats to our security."); see
also Liz linas, Does 25-YearuOld Lepislation Adequately Protect Internet Privac ?. BiAZE
(Oct. 21, 2011, 11 :30 PM), http:/iwwv.theblaze.con/stories/does-25-year-old-
legislation-adequately-protcCt-intcrnct-privacy/ (discussing Senator Leahy's proposal to
update the law).
77. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011.
112th Cong. (2011); Klimas, supra note 76 (discussing Senator Leahy's proposed
privacy protections); Press Release. Sen. Patrick Leahy, supra note 76 (outlining the
proposal to overhaul the ECPA).
78. See KAHN & CERF, supra note 34, at 21 (explaining how the ARPAnet network
was linked to computers at several British universities); Barr M. Leiner et al., A Brie
HistoUy ofj he Internet, INTERNET SOC'Y, http:/iww.internetsociet .orgiinternct/
interL-51/history-internt/briefhistory-internet (last visited May 25. 2012)
(discussing the role played by the United Kingdom in the establishment of the
network).
79. See Campbellv. MGN Ltd.. [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. (H.L.) 457 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (protecting a celebrity's privacy); Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd.,
[1999] UKHL 45, [2001] 2 A.C. (H.I.) 127 (appeal taken from Eng.) (stressing the
social importance of protecting reputation); James v. Commonwealth, [1936] A.C. 578
(P.C.) (appeal taken hom High Court of Australia) (expounding the negative right of
free speech present in English law); Over iew oJ he (K System of Government, l)IRECTGOV,
http://wwwdiriet.gov.uk/en/goverinmentcitizensandrigh s/ukgoverinlent/central
governi ell andth oiarch y/dg_073438 (last visited May 25, 2012) (presenting an
over iew of the UK government).
20121 SOCIAL MEDIA NORMS AND REGULATION
into domestic law, which includes the right to privacy and
freedom of expression.8 1)
Specifically, Ar ticle 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights provides that "[e]veryone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence. "81 Article 10 states: "Everyone has the right to
freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. "2
The United Kingdom's understanding of freedom of
speech is very different than the understanding in the United
States. S3 While the US Constitution weighs heavily in favor of
protecting the freedom of expression, the United Kingdom has
a very strong libel regime that seeks to protect the right to
reputation and privacy. 84As a result, free speech considerations
are not as highly valued.15 One example of this trend is the
recent development of the super-injunction.8b Relying on the
right to privacy contained in the European Convention of
Human Rights, UK courts have begun issuing injunctions that
prevent news organizations from revealing the identities of those
80. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.); Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedomis, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
[hereinafter ECHR].
81. ECHR, sopra note 80, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
82. Id. art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
83. See FREDLRICKW. MAITLAND & FRANCIS (. MONTAGUL. A SKLTCH OF ENGLISH
LL(AL HISTORY 161 (James F. Colby ed., 1998) (introducing the development of law in
the United Kingdom); see also ALASTAIR Mii is & ANDREW SCOTT, SOMETIHING ROTTEN
IN THE STATE OF ENGLISH LIBLL LAwv?: A RLJOINDER TO THL (LAIOUR FOR REFORM OF
DULFMATION 17 (2010) (stating that "[t]here are observable dilferences when
comparing the law of England and Wales with that of the United States").
84. Compare Reynolds, [1999] U~I-IL 45 (affirming that "reputation is an integral
and important part of the dignity of the individual" and then went flurther to state that
.protection of reputation is conducive to the public good"), with Citizens United v.
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876. 891 (2010) ("First Amendment standards, however, 'mnust give the
benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech.'").
85. See, e.g., MULLIS & SCOTT, supra note 83, [ 9-11 (discussing attempts at
reforming the libel reginic in the United Kingdom); Robinson, supra note 31, at 6
(describing the creation of super-injunctions).
86. See Robinson, supa note 31, at 6 (providing a definition of a super-
injunction); see also So)maiya, supa note 31, at A4 (summnarizing the elements of a
super-injunction).
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involved in legal disputes, or even reporting the fact that
restrictions have been imposed.8
These kinds of developments have led many to conclude
that that the libel regime in the United Kingdom is in severe
need of reform.8 8 In March 2011, the UK Ministry of Justice
published a "Draft Defamation Bill.'"" ° The consultation paper
accompanying the bill noted concerns regarding "the
detrimental effects the current libel regime has had on freedom
of expression." 0 The bill also contained new procedures and
provisions for reforming the law to strike the right balance
between protection of freedom of speech and protection of
reputation. 1
In recent years, however, there has been a shift toward
increased surveillance and police measures in the United
Kingdom. 92 Interception and filtering measures have been
87. See. e.g., Robinson, supra note 31, at 6 (describing the characteristics of a
super-injunction); see also, e.g., Somnaiya, supra note 31, at A4 ("[T]hc super-injunctions
offer a way of stopping stories before they collie out and are frequ ently served on
multiple newspapers to pre-empt any possible publication .... ").
88. See 27 Jan. 2010, PARL. DEB., (H.C.) (2010) 58 (U.K.), available at
http:i / www.publications.parliament.uki pa/cm200910 cmihansri cml00127
/wmstexti 100 127m000 L .htm (noting the establishment of a working group to address
the governmens "concerns about the possibility that [the United Kingdom's] libel
laws are having a chilling effect on fred(lom of expression"). See generally MtULLIS &
SCOTT, surpa note 83 (providing suggestions ol ways to improve the libel regime in the
United Kingdom).
89. JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE DRAFT DEFANIATION BILL, DRAFT DLE ANLTION BILL,
2010-12, H.I. 203, H.C. 930-1 (U.K.); see MINISTRY OFJUSTICE, )RAFT DEFAIATION
BILL: (ONSULTATION PAPER, 2011, Cm. 8020, at3 (U.K.) (commenting on the proposal
of the Draft Defamation Bill).
90. MINISTRY OFj.LSTICE, supra note 89, at 5.
91. Id. at 5-7; see Press Release, Joint Select Comm., Parliament (U.K), Jin
C(oninittce Publishes Report on Draft Detamation Bill (Oct. 19, 2011), available at
http://w pv.parliament.uk/business/committees/coimittees-a-z/ioint-select/draft-
defaimation-bill /iews/publication-repr t/ ("The unanimnously-agreed report
proposes many detailed amendnints to the defenses available against libel claims,
mainly designed to strike a fairer balance betw.een the protection of reputation and
fr eedom of speech. ").
92. See Dominic Casciani, Plan to ionitor All Internet Use, BBC NEws, Apr. 27, 2009,
http:/inews.bbc.co.ulk/2/hii8020039.stm (describing a new initiative where
communications firms would record all internet contacts between people as part of a
modernization of UK police surveillance tactics); Ryan Gallagher & Rajeev Syal, !Wet
Police ("sirg. Srila-ce SYstem to lontor Mobile Phones, GUARDIAN (U. K), Oct. 30, 2011,
at 8 (discussing covert surveillance technology that allows British police to shut off
phones remtely, intrcept communicatils, and gather data folm users); Toim Kelly,
Revled: Big Brother Britain Has More CCTV Cam eras that Chi'a, I)AIIY MAIL (U.K.),
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implemented by state agencies as a means for a wide range of
goals, including combating terrorism and preventing child
abuse."3 Critics have often referred to these types of regulations
as "Big Brother plans" in a reference to George Orwell's novel
1984.4
In 2000, Parliament passed the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act ("RIPA"), which allowed public bodies to carry out
surveillance and investigation. 95 RIPA can be invoked by
government officials on the grounds of national security, and for
purposes of detecting crime, preventing disorder, public safety,
protecting public health, or in the interests of the economic
well-being of the United Kingdom. -6 Many critics claim that
RIPA was pushed through under the guise of fighting terrorism,
internet crime, and pedophilia without being substantively
debated in Parliament. 7 These critics say that the regulations
are excessive and pose a threat to civil liberties. 98
Aug. 11, 2009, http:/iww .dailymail.co.ukinewsiarticle-1205607iShock-figures-reveal-
Britain-CC TV-camera- 14-people-C hina.htunl (stating that Britain has 4.2 million
closed circuit TV cameras, one per every fourteen people, that are used by the
government).
93. See 1iVF Histoi,. INTERNLT WATCH FoUNt)., http:// ww.iwtorg.uk/abotL-iwf
iwl-history (last visited May 25, 2012) (describing the purpose of internet surveillance);
see also Casciani. supra note 92 ("Comnmunications data is an essential tool for law
enforcement agencies to track murderers, pedophilcs, save lives and tackle crime."
(quoting UK Home Secretay jacqui Smith)); Gallagher & Syal, supra note 92, at 8
("[The] products are designed to provide law enforcement, military, security agencies
and special forces with the means to 'gather early intelligence in order to identify and
anticipate threat and illegal activity belore it can be deployed'.").
94. See Casciani, supra note 92 (expounding the dangers of "big brother
databases" that store massive about of information about users); Kelly, supra note 92
("Big Brother Britain has more CCTV cameras than China."). George Orwell's 1984 is
a dystopian novel set in a world of peivasive government surveillance and public mind
control. GEOR(GE ORWELL, 1984 (1950).
95. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23 (Eng.).
96. Id. § 5(3).
97. See Xaman Akdcniz ct al., Regulation of lnvestigatoI7 Powers Act 2000(i):
BigBrother.gov. u: State Surveillance in the Age of InJbrinmation and Rights, 2001 CRIM. I .
RPV. 73, 77-80 (criticizing parts of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
("RIPA")); see also Gordan Rayner & Richard AIcync, Council Spy Cases Hit 1,000 a
Month, TFIFGRAPH (U.K.), Apr. 12, 2008, at I ("Councils and other public bodies are
using legislation designed to combat terrorisin in order to Spy on people, obtain their
telephone records and find out who they arc emailing.").
98. See Casciani, supra note 92 (noting that the government has gone too far in
building a culture of surveillance and calling for change); see also Akdeniz Ct al., supra
note 97, at 79 (claiming that RIPA is overly broad in several respects); John O(zinck.
RIPA Ring Closes Enuyption Key Loophole, REGISTER (U.K.), Oct. 14, 2008,
503
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The United Kingdom has faced many of the same debates
as those in the United States over the proper role of internet
surveillance and regulation. " Because there is no written
constitution in the United Kingdom, however, there is a lack of
guidance in legal authority. 101A House of Commons report
acknowledged the limited body of case law on freedom of
expression and privacy and recommended that, until major
reforms are made, the common law should remain the basis
upon which disputes are resolved.1" This has resulted in a
conflicting message and a haphazard approach to regulation by
the government. 102
http:/iwwv.theregister.co.uki2008i 10/ 14/ripasell incrimination ruling/ ("Critics
of RIPA continue to argue that the law is over-broad and capable of bringing about
serious inju s t ic e . '' ) .
99. See, e.g, Akdeniz et al., .spra note 97, at 79 (arguing that legislation in the
United Kingdom is overly broad); Gallagher & Syal, supra note 92, at 8 (discussing the
debate over surveillance measures).
100. See Dan Sabbagh, Tories Torn over Regulatirg Socia 'dia, GUARDIAN (U.K.),
Aug. 24. 2011, at 16 (stating that British politicians have struggled to contend with
Twitter. Facebook. and other social media in a Lile of crisis without a written
constitution). See generally Simon Sellars, Orire Privacy: Do 11e Have It ard Do We 11tr
It? A Review of the Risks and UK Case Law. 33 EUR. INTE I. PROP. REV. 9 (2011)
(providing an overview of the issues that arise when attempting to regulate social
media).
101. See COMMITTEE ON CI TURE, MEDIA, ANT) SPORT, (OMMUNICATIONS REFORM:
(ONTEXT ANt) RATIONALE, 2001. H.(. 161-I, [ 16 (U.K), available at
http:iiww,,Tpublications.parlianent.ukipa/cim200001 icmselecticmcumedsi 16l/
16103.htin ("The White Paper does accept that the governmient must have a clear
policy framework tor 'this rapidly developing sector, which will be so central to our
economy, democratic life, culture, entertainment and education,' but does not itself
ofter such a tiamework."); Sellars, supra note 100, at 9-10 ("The House of Coinnons
(ulture, Media and Sport Select (ommittee report ... acknowledges the limited body
of case law on ireedom of expression and privacy, but declines to recommend
legislative intelvention. The Cominittee believes that the lack of unity on the part of
the media industr) and the 'infinitely different circumstances which can arise in
dilferent cases' mean that the flexibility of the common law should, for the time being,
remain the basis upon which disputes are resolved.").
102. See MULLIS & SCOTT, sup a note 83, at 2 (criticizing the haphazard approach
to regulation of the libel regime in the United Kingdom); Sabbagh, sopra note 100, at
16 (comparing the response to super-injunctions, where the governmient desired less
regulation. with lie News International tabloid phone-hacking crisis of 2011, where the
government stated there should be more).
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3. The Internet Phenomenon: Egypt
Eventually, the Internet's reach extended to less-
technologically advanced countries such as Egvpt.0 3 The typical
debates and issues took on new meaning in countries with
drastically different understandings of accepted norms and
standards of internet governance. 10 4 In 1971, the Arab Republic
of Egypt adopted a democratic constitution. 105 Specifically,
Article 47 stated: "Freedom of opinion is guaranteed. Every
individual shall have the right to express his opinion and to
disseminate it verbally, in writing, illustration or by other means
within the limits of the law." I 0" Articles 47 and 48 also provided
for freedom of opinion and freedom of press.117 In 1982, Egypt
became a party to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights108 While these steps appear to establish Egypt as
a democratic nation, many believe that they were merely
"window-dressing" as the Egyptian government attempted to
promote its legitimacy.0 9
103. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. FALSE FREEDOM: ONLINE CENSORSHIP IN THE
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 17-26 (2005) (presenting an introduction to the
Internet in Egypt).
104. See, e.g., id. at 29-30 (citing examples of people who have been detained tor
things they wrote about on the Internet); OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN
ECPT 1, 4 (2009), available at http://opennet net/sites/opennet.net/iles/
ONIEgypt 2009.pdf (describing the problems the Egyptian government faced when
regulating the Internet).
105. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBIIC OF ELGPT, 1I Sept. 1971, (1s amended.
May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26. 2007.
106. Id. art. 47.
107. Id. aits. 47-48.
108. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-Signatuires, Accessios,
Sqccesioj.g Ratation,, U.N. TREATY COILECTION, http:/itreaties.un.org/pagesi
ViewDetails.a.px?src-TREATY&mtdsg-no-IV-4&chapter-4&lang-en (last visited May
25, 2012); see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966. 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinalter ICCPR]; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 103, at
37-38 (stating that Egypt is a party to the International Covenant on Human and
Political Rights).
109. TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POTR I AW,
POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT 7-8 (2007) (describing how the
Egyptian government signed and ratified international conventions as "window-
dressing" to attract economic development, with no expectation that they would
someday be used to enfirce rights); see also OPENNET IN1TIATVE, swpra note 104, at 4
("Despite [he governnents initiaLives t encourage internet use, the Egyptian
authorities continue to place restrictions on how Egyptians use the Internet.")
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The Internet became available to the Egyptian public in
1996. Il The Egyptian government initially pursued an
ambiguous policy in regards to the Internet, seeking to expand
Egyptians' access to the Internet on the one hand while
enforcing legislation criminalizing the freedom of expression on
the other. I The imposition of emergency law gave the
president broad powers on the grounds of protecting public
safety and national security.112 In addition, all ISPs passed
through the state-run telecommunications company, Telecom
Egypt, which facilitates govermnent surveillance." 3 As a result,
the Egyptian government found itself in the precarious position
of attempting to respect democracy-minded internet principles
and norms while still trying to control all aspects of society 14
The Ministry of Communications and Information
Technology ("Ministry of Communications") was established in
October 1999 with the intent to grow the country's
technological infrastructure. 15 The Ministry of Communications
launched several programs from 2002-2005, such as the Free
Internet Program and the PC for Every Home program, seeking
110. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 103, at 17-21 (describing thc
introduction of the Internet to Egypt); see also Amir Hatern Ali, The Power of Social !vdi,
in Developing Nations: New Tools for Closing the Global Digital Divide and Beyond. 24 HARV.
HUN. RTs. .. 185. 208 (2011) ("The Internet was introduced in Egypt in 1993 and was
commercialized in 1996, alter which the Internet in Egypt underwent a period of
s ubstLaintial growthI.").
111. See HUNL RIGHTS WATCH, sup a note 103, at 17-18 (describing the initial
approach that the Egyptian governrment took in regulating the Internet); see also Ali,
supra note 110. at 208-09 (tracing the changing response of the Egyptian government).
112. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, s u a note 103, at 41 (explicating the president's
powers under emergency law); see also Daniel Williams, Egypt Extends 25-Year-Old
Emergency Law: Vlubarak Had Vowed to Replace Far-Reaching Measure; US. Push for Reforn
Seen Easing WASH. POST, May 1, 2006, at A13 (describing Egyp's emergency law and its
unpopularity with the public).
113. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, sopra note 103, at 24 ("Ignoring the fact that
Egypt has no law that specifically prohibits visiting such sires, Issnat said that
surveillance was easy because all internet service providers ("ISPs") passed through the
state-run Egypt Telecoin."); see also OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 104, at 2
(discussing the role of Telecom Egypt).
114. See HU IAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 103, at 17-18 (noting the competing
interests of the Egyptian government); Ali, sup a note 110, at 208-09 (tracing the
changing response of the Egyptian government).
115. See HUNIAN RIGHTS WATCH, sopra note 103, at 19 (tracing the ways the
Egyptian governmcnt initially sought to spread [echnology); see also OPLNNLT
INITLAIIVE, sup a note 104, at 2 (describing tlhe Etgypian governcmiCnts internet
initiative).
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to make the Internet more affordable and more widely
available,.1 Critics, however, argued that the Ministry was simply
the propaganda arm of President Hosni Mubarak's regime.1 1 7
In September 2002, Egypt's Interior Ministry formed the
General Administration for Information and Documentation
("GAID") to police the Internet. 11 In March 2004, the
Department for Confronting Computer and Internet Crime was
formed."1 ° In 2008, rumors persisted of a special division called
the State Security Investigation Police for Facebook. 120 Early on,
these units worked to censor internet pornography. 21 The units
116. See HIILMvN RIGHTS VATCH, supra note 103, at 19 (discussing the
establishment of several programs as a means of spreading technology); see also Press
Release, ITIDA, Dr. Kamel Witnesses Agreement Signing to Spread PC for Every Home
Initiaive Nationwide (Aug. 25, 2008). available at http:/www.docstoc.co/(ocs/
743 6977 /kamel-X\'ltnesses-Agreement-Slgning-to-Spread-1)( -Inter net-Service-
(describing the "PC For Every Home" initiative, whereby families will be able to pay for
computers on credit via a monthly surcharge on their telephone bills).
117. See Wilitapy Ralers Ignore Pharal Voices, IFEX July 27, 2011),
http://wNw.itcx.org/egypt/2011/O7/27/Inilitaiy-ignore-plural-voices/ ("Long seen
by journalists as the propaganda arn of Mubarak's regime, scrapping [the Ministry of
Communications and Technology] was a key demand of members of the 18-day
revolution .... "); see also FREEDOM HoUSF, FRFETOM ON THE NET 2011: EGYPT 5-8
(2011), available at tP: //www.fecdoinhouse.org/ sites/ default/files/inline-images/
EgyptFOTN201 I.pdf (discussing the way that the Ministry of Communications and
Technology has responded to the spread of social media sites).
118. See ILIMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 103, at 24 (discussing how the
department monitored the Internet in real time, seeking out and arresting those who
went to pornographic sites, despite the fact that Egypt had no law prohibiting it); LEI A
HASSAN1N, GLOBAL INTO. SOC'Y VATCH. EGYPT, 122 n.16 (2009), available at
http:iiwww.giswatch.orgisites/default/ilesi/gc pt.pdf (" [The General Administration
for Infoi rIation and Documentation] was formed in 2002 by the Egyptian Ministr) of
Interior and has been policing the internet ever since.").
119. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 103, at 24 ("In March 2004, the
government-owned daily al-Ahram first reported the existence of another specialized
unit within the Interior Ministry, the Department for Confronting Computer and
Internet Crime."); see also GAMAI EIT, THE INTERNET IN THE ARAB WORII): A NEW
SPACE OF REPRESSION? (2004), available at http://www.anhri.netien/reports/net2004i
index.shml (discussing the establishment of the Department for Confronting
Computer and Internet Crime).
120. See Runors of a lacebook Block Persist in Eg pt. supa note 1 (noting the rumnors
of a special Facebook division of the police force): see also OPLNNLT INITIATIVE, supra
note 104, at 4 ("Some also believe there is a special division called the State Security
Police for Facebook.").
121. See HASSAN1N. supra note 118, at 122 n.16 (introducing the General
Administration for Information and L)ocumenttion, an organization formed by the
Egyptian Minisut of Interior that was charged with policing the Internet against
pornography); see also OPLNNLT INITIATIVE, supra note 104, at 5 (discussing the ways
the nation filters pornography).
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also have detained bloggers and political activists for a variety of
reasons, sometimes without charging them with a crime. 122
Relying on emergency law, the authorities have applied broad
power in detaining people they suspected of criminal activity.123
Governments in Egypt and other developing nations continue to
struggle with the growth of the Internet and the growing
expectations that established norms will be respected.2 4
B. The Emergence of Internet Aormns and Standards
Norms and standards developed simultaneously with the
growth of the Internet and provided the foundation for modern
conceptions of internet governance.12 5 The Working Group on
Internet Governance ("WGIG"), a group established by the
United Nations to make proposals for action on the governance
of the Internet, defines internet governance as the
"development and application by Governments, the private
sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared
principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and
programmes that shape the evolution and use of the
Internet. '" 1 26 As technology improves, the exigencies of internet
122. See OPENNET INITIATIT, s upr( note 104, at 3-4 (giving examples of activist
bloggers held by the authorities); see also HUNLN RIGHTSWATCH, sup)a note 103, at 29-
30 (providing the example of Ashraf Ibrahim, who was held for nearly four months
before being charged with "harming Egypt's reputation by spreading abroad false
information regarding the internal affairs of the countr) to foreign bodics-human
rights organizations-which includes, contrary to the truth, violations of human rights
within the country").
123. See HUMAN RIGHTS WVATCH. supra note 103, at 24-25 (discussing the
detention of individuals under the emergency law); OPENNET INITIATIAE, sura note
104, at 3-4 (giving examples of activist bloggers held by the authorities); see also infra
Part I1.( (discussing abuses by the Egyptian government).
124. See Ali, supra note 110, at 185-86 (discussing the problems that the Egyptian
government has taced as internet use has become more pervasive); HMIAN RIGHTS
WATCH, sup a note 103, at 24-25 (presenting examples of incidents involving internet
bloggers); OPENNET INITIATIAE, supra note 104, at 3-4 (describing steps taken by the
Egyptian government to control the Internet).
125. SeeWu, supra note 10, at 663 ("[I] t is useful to think of the Internet less as a
place and more as a regime of transnational norms and rules (a logical counterpart to
transnational law) that regulates international interactions between individuals."); see
also Leinley, supra note 10, at 1260 (discussing the existence of normins and standards
that might be thought of as true private ordering: the social relationships that
individuals and groups foirm that operate outside of the law).
126. World Summit oil the Information Society, supra note 33, 10 (defining
internet governance); see Press Release, United Nations, United Nations Established
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governance change.127 Yet, while internet standards continue to
evolve, their underlying values of transparency, freedom of
expression, and privacy persist.128
As a result of its development in the United States, the US
government unilaterally controlled the Internets initial
architecture and infrastructure. IN-' This also means that the
norms and standards that developed reflected those found in
the United States.1 , ) Freedom of expression and privacy are
rooted in the US Constitution. 131 American jurisprudence and
policy have further ingrained these tenets. 132 Private groups,
Working Group On Internet Governance, P/ 1620 (Nov. 11, 2004) (announcing the
creation of tihe group).
127. See World Summit on the Information Societ
, 
supra note 33, 1[ 8 ("During
the 10 years in which the Internet evolved from a research and academic lacility into 'a
global facility available to the public', very difierent points of view emerged about the
scope and mechanisms of Internet governance."). Compare Wtu, supra note 10. at 649-
50 (discussing Internet governance in light of the existing technology in 1997), with
Sylvain, supra note 38, at 208-09 (describing policymaking in terms of broadband
technology).
128. See World Summit on the Information Society, upra note 33, 11 13-28
(identitxing the issues that continue to be relevant to intercnet governance); Sylvain,
supra note 38, at 212-15 (describing tihe standards used by early internet engineers and
discussing how agencies like the Federal Communications Commission continue to use
the standards when regulating the Internet).
129. See 'World Summit on the Information Society, supra note 33, 1[ 15 (stating
that the United States was initially responsible for the growth and development of the
Internet); see also George Sadowsky, The Interwt Society and Developing Countries, F-OTI:
ONTHLINTERNLT, Nov./Dec. 1996, http:// Nww.isoc.org/oti/articles/l 196/
sadowsky.html (" It is true that the roots of the Internet in North America, coupled with
the initial explosion of content in the same general region, currently make the
Internet, and especially the 'World Wide Web, primarily a medium of expression in
English.").
130. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 32, 25 (citing the protection of privacy and
individual liberties and the advancement of fiee flows of personal data as two essential
basic values); Sadowsky, supra note 130 (" The culture of the Internet reflects its roots in
the North American research communit .... Important elements of that culture
include broad frecdoim of expression and sharing of information.").
131. See e.g., U.S. (ONST. amends. I, XIV; see supra Part I.A.I (tracing the
developments in internet law).
132. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006)) (governing the collection, maintenance, use,
and dissemination of personally identifiable information about individuals that is
maintained in systems of records by federal agencies); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969) (holding that the government cannot punish inflammatory speech
unless it is intended to incite imminent lawless action); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (finding that a right to privacy could be found in the
"penumbras" and "emanations" of other constitutional protections).
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international organizations, and governmental agencies have
applied these principles in establishing some semblance of
internet governance. I
1. Establishing Norms: Technological and Engineering Groups
In the early days of the Internet, technological and
engineering organizations were given almost exclusive
responsibility over the direction of internet development.13 4
These groups were responsible for determining the initial
principles and standards that would guide the Internet's
growth. 135 Each group has stressed the importance of
transparency and openness when developing the Internet.' 36b As
a result, users now expect both freedom of expression and
privacy when partaking in social media.13,7
The Internet Engineering Task Force's ("IETF") is a group
of network designers, operators, vendors, and researchers.' 8 Its
133. See infra Part II (setting forth the ways ditcrent groups have established
internet norms and standards).
134. See KAHN & CERF, sorpa note 34, at 28-34 (outlining the responsibilities of
different organizations); Sylvain, supra note 38, at 212 ("The network-design fcatures
that have made the Internet an especially transformative medium are captured in three
principles championed by the IETF, the preeminent technical standard-setting
organization tor the industry .... ").
135. See The T o oJthe IETF A Novice's Guide to the Internet Ergireering Task Force,
INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE, http:/iwww.ietf.org/tao.html#anchor5 (last
visited May 25, 2012) (stating that " [t]hc goal of the 1ETF is to have its standards widely
used and validated in the marketplace"); see also KAHN & (ERF, sopra note 34, at 30-31
(outlining the responsibilities of difirent organizations).
136. See, e.g., ICAN Accountabiity & Transparency, INTERNLT (ORP. ASSIGNED
NAMES & NUMBERS, http://wwv.icann.org/en/nevs/in-louis/accountabilit (last
visited May 25, 2012) (presenting the goals of the organization); The IETF Standards
Process. INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE, http: //~w,.i. org/about /standards-
process.html (last visited May 25, 2012) (listing openness and fairness as goals of the
IETF Standards Process).
137. See FED. TRADE (OMM'N. PROTECTING (ONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSE) FRAMEWORK FOR BU SINESS ANT) P101,1(CYAKERS;
PREI IMINARY FTC STAFF REPORT 53 (2010), (vailable at http:/iwww.tc.gov/os/2010/
12/101201privacyreport.pdf (recognizing users' expectations when proposing a new
framework for regulations); Letter from Michael Richter, Chief Privacy Counsel,
Facebook, to the Fed. Trade (oinm'n (Feb. 18 2011), available at http://wsNw.ftc.gov/
os/comments/privacreporfriiamework/00413-58069.pdf [hereinafter Letter from
Facebook to the FTC] (stressing the importance of the FTC respecting users'
expectations when crafting policy).
138. See About the JETI. INTERNET ENGINEERING TAsKIFORCL, http://wvw.ief'org/
about/ (last visited May 25, 2012) (describing the I ETF); see aalso Syvain, supra note 38,
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mission is to make the Internet work better by producing
technical documents that influence the way people design, use,
and manage the Internet." , - The group is organized into
thousands of working groups that deal with specific topics. 14
Throughout its existence, the IETF has followed the same
guiding principles: openness and fairness. 14 1 The goal for these
original architects of the Internet was to avoid centralized
governmental contro 1 42 According to the IETF, govermnent s
only obligation is "to stay out of the way and eschew
censorship." 143
Another group that works to preserve the openness,
transparency, and stability of the Internet is the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"). 144
at 206 (delining the ETF as a private self-regulatory organization comprised of
geographically dispersed engineers and application designers).
139. ission Statement. INTERNET ENGINEERING TAISK FORCE, http://www.ietl orgi
aboutimission.htrml (last visited May 25, 2012); see also Syvain, supra note 38, at 206
(describing the IETF as a "private self-regulatory organization[] for which
decentralization, user empowerment, and interoperability [is] a priorit " ) .
140. SeeAbout the IETF,, supra note 138 ("The Internet Engineering Task Force is a
large open international community of network designers, operators, vendors, and
researchers concerned with the evolution of the Internet architecture and the smooth
operation of the Internet."); see also Sylvain, supra note 38, at 206 (defining the IETF as
a private self-rcgulatory organization comprised of geographically dispersed engineers
and application designers).
141. See The fETF Sta ndards Process, supra note 136 (mentioning openness and
tairness as major guiding principles of the IETF Standards Process); see also Sylvain,
supra note 38, at 217 ("These authorities [referring to the IETF]. the FCC explained,
show that, first, the Internet is meant to aflord users access to the content and
applications of their choice, and, second, its original engineers and programmers
wanted disparately located users to be able to collaborate and comment on a common
project.").
142. See A. Michael Froomnkin, Habermas@Discoarse. net: Toward a Critical Theory oJ
Cyberspace, 116 I-ARv. L. RLV. 749, 811 (2003) ("[The] Internet is for evervone-but it
won't be if Governments restrict access to it, so we must dedicate ourselves to keeping
the network unrestricted, unfettered and unregulated."); see also Sylvain, supra note 38,
at 212 (presenting intcroperability as a principle championed by the IETF and defining
it as "the principle that independent computer networks are not barred from freely
exchanging information with others").
143. Froomkin, supra note 142, at 811; see Sylvain, supa note 38, at 212 (referring
to user empowerment as the "notion that nothing in the maintenance of the physical
network may intertre with any user's access to all of the services, applications, and
other users of her choice").
144. See Welcome to ICANN, INTERNET CORP. ASSIGNED NAMES & NUMBLRS,
http://ww .icann.org/en/about/wclcoic (last visited May 25, 2012) (introducing the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN")); see also KAHN &
CERF, supra note 34, at 33 (providing a background to ICANN).
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Formed in 1998, ICANN is a nonprofit corporation that oversees
a number of Internet-related tasks including the use of internet
names and numbers. 145 ICANN's goals include helping to
presene the operational stability of the Internet, to promote
competition, and to achieve broad representation of the global
internet community.146
These groups and others like them allow the Internet to
function and have been vital to its growth.1 47 From their initial
guidance, international organizations began to develop new
ideas concerning internet governance, building on the
foundation laid by engineering groups like the IETF and
ICAN N.148
2. Adopting Norms: International Organizations
As the Internet's reach expanded, international
organizations also have tried to establish some form of universal
internet governance. 149 Numerous international agreements
protect both freedom of expression and privacy.150 Specifically,
Axticle 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights guarantees the right to freedom of expression, including
the "freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in
145. See Welcome to CANA , supra note 144 (presenting background on ICANN); see
also KAHN & (ERF, supra note 34, at 33 (providing a background to ICANN).
146. See TV]at Does ICANN Do?, INTERNET CORP. ASSIGNED NAMFS & NUMBFRS,
http://wNw.icann.org/en/about/participate/what (last visited May 25. 2012) (Listing
the goals of ICANN); see aso kAHN & CERF, s p# a note 34, at 33 (providing a
background to IC NN).
147. See AHN & (LRI, supa note 34, at 28-34 (describing the functions of
dilferent internet groups); Sylvain, supra note 38, at 206 (expressing the importance of
technological organizations in developing the rules for network regulation).
148. See infra Part I.B.2 (explaining how international organizations helped to
spread internet norms and standards).
149. See generaliy, e.g., World Summit on the Information Society, supra note 33
(reporting on the statC of internet governance on behalf of the United Nations
("UN")); World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva 2003-Tunis 2005,
Declaration of Principles: Building the 1nforomation Society; A Global Challenge in the Naw
Millenniu. WSIS-03/Gencva/Doc/4-E (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.itu.int/
wsis/docs/genevaioflicial/dop.html [hereinafter WSIS )eclaration of Principles]
(presenting a set of Internet principles and standards).
150. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 80, arts. 8, 10, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230; 1CCPR, supra
note 108, arts. 17, 19, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177-78.
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print, in the form of art, or through any other media."1 51 Privacy
is protected in Article 17, Which states: "No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his
honor and reputation." 152 Consequently, there is an
understanding that it is equally important to protect both
freedom of expression and privacy when dealing with internet
governance internationally. 153 The United States, United
Kingdom, and Egypt are all parties to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.154
The United Nations has become one of the major actors
working to institute a comprehensive understanding of internet
governance. 155 It has established working groups and held
conferences with the goal of establishing norms of internet
governance to be used internationally.'56 For example, in 2000,
the United Nations funded a workshop on the principles of
freedom of expression. 15 During the workshop, the committee
151. ICPR, supra note 108, art. 19, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
152. Id. art. 17. 999 U.N.T.S at 177.
153. See World Summit on the Information Society, supra note 33. J[J[ 24-25
(listing ireedom of expression and privacy rights as public policy issues that are relevant
to Internet governance).
154. See, e.g., Inter. ational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-Signatures,
Accessions. Successions, Ratf,,catons, supra note 108.
155. See, e.g., World Stmmit on the Information Society, supra note 33. [[ 1-6
(establishing a group to report on the state of Internet governance); ARTICLE 19,
DEFINING DEFAMATION: PRINCIPLES OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PROTECTION OF
REPUTATION 2-3 (2000), available at http:i/ /N,,w.articlel9.org data files pdf/
standards/definingdaeimation.pdf (prescribing principles of fieedom of expression
and protection of reputation foIllowing a workshop sponsored by the United Nations)
[hereinafter DEFINING )EFAMATION].
156. See, e.g., World Summit on the Information Society, supra note 33. [[ 1-6
(establishing the Working Group while recognizing that the Internet is "a central
element of the infriastructure of the emerging infirmation society, while recognizing
that there are differing views on the suitability of current institutions and mechanisms
for managing processes and developing policies for the global Internet"); DEFINING
)EFAMATION, supra note 155, at 2-3 (introducing freedom of expression and
protection of reputation as important principles).
157. DEFINING DEFAMATION, supra note 155, at 1; see HOUSF OF COIMONS SEIECT
(OMMITTLL ON CULTURE, MLDIA, AND SPORT, SUPPLEMLNTARY W RITTEN EVIDENCE
FROM ARTICLL 19 (2009) (U.K.), available at htt):/'/ ,.publications.parliament.uk/
pa /cm200809icmselecticmcumeds/memoipressiu m8902.htm (examining
international standards relating to freedom of exprcsion generally and then in the
particular context of defamation laws, focusing mainly on Lhe jurisprudence of [he
European Court of Human Rights).
1514 FORDIAM INTERNATIONAL LA1WJOU[7RNAL [Vol. 35:1485
reaffirmed the belief that "freedom of expression and the free
flow of information... are of crucial importance in a
democratic society, for the personal development, dignity and
fulfillment of every individual, as well as for the progress and
welfare of society, and the enjoyment of other human rights and
fundamental freedoms.' 15 In addition, the committee asserted
that any restriction on freedom of expression must be subject to
adequate safeguards against abuse as an aspect of the rule of
law. 159
In 2003 and 2005, the United Nations sponsored a two-part
conference, called the World Summit on the Information
Society ("WSIS"). 1 Held in Geneva in 2003 and Tunis in 2005,
the conference discussed issues relating to communication,
information, and technology. 161 The WSIS Declaration of
Principles was established, reaffirming the right to freedom of
expression16 Relying on Article 19 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the WSIS Declaration stated that the right
includes "freedom to hold opinions without interference and to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers. "16
After the conference, several other groups emerged from
the mandate of the WSIS.6 4 The WGIG was formed in 2003 to
158. DEFININ, DEAMATION, supra note 155, at 2.
159. Id. at 3-4.
160. See G.A. Res. 56/ 183, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RESi56/ 183 can. 31, 2002),
((lable at http:iiww.it.int/wsis/docs/backgriound/resoluions/56 183 unga_
2002.pdf (adopting a resolution calling for a world suninit to "address the whole range
of relevant issues related to the information society, through the development of a
common vision and understanding of the information society and thre adoption of a
declaration and plan of action tor implementation by governments, international
institutions and all sectors of civil society"); WSIS Declaration of Principles, supra note
149 (discussing the role of the Working Group on Internet Governance ("WGIG") in
determining an appropriate approach to intrnet governance).
161. See generally World Summit on the Information Society, supra note, 33, 5
(mentioning the goals of the sumuit).
162. See WSIS Declaration of Principles, supra note 149, 4; see also World Summit
on the Information Society, supra note 33, 11 13-36 (affirming the principles
established at the summit).
163. WSIS Declaration of Principles, supa note 149, 4: see also World Sutmmiit on
the Information Society, supra note, 33, 1" L 13-36 (affirming the principles established
at the summit).
164. See WSIS Declaration of Principles, supra note 149, 1[ 50 (mandating the
creation of a working group on internet governance); World Summit on the
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determine the public policy issues relevant to internet
governance. 165 The group was asked to develop an
understanding of the roles of governments, international
organizations, the private sector, and civil society from
developing and developed countries. 16 The United Nations also
announced the establishment of the Internet Governance
Forum in 2006, which brought together groups that represent
governments, the private sector, and civil society to establish a
policy dialogue on issues of internet governance.16
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD") is an example of an international
economic organization that has played a role in shaping internet
norms. 18 The OECD has formed a Group of Experts on
Transborder Data Barriers and Privacy Protection that was
instructed to develop guidelines on basic rules governing the
protection of personal data and privacy across borders in order
to enable coordination of national legislation. 1 9 The OECD
Information Societ,, supra note 33, 1[ 1-6 (providing an example of one of the groups
that was formed after the summit).
165. See World Sunnit on the Information Society, supra note 33, 1[ 5 ("The
WGIG has been asked, inter alia, to 'investigate and make proposals for action, as
appropriate, on the governance of the Internet.'").
166. See World Summit on the Information Societ
, 
supra note 33, 4 (restating
the mandate of the World Summit on the Intormation Society ("WSIS")); see also WSIS
Declaration of principles, sopra note 149, 50 (mandating the creation of a working
group on Internet governance).
167. See About the Internet Governance Forum, INTERNET GOVERNANCE .,
http:/iwwinttgovforum.orgicmsiaboutigf (last updated May 24, 2012) (discussing
the creation of the Internet Governance Forum); see also Annan Announces UNForu m on
Internet Governance, GOV'T TECH., Mar. 3. 2006. Ltp:/ /Nw,.govtech.com/e-
gov erinentinnan-Announces-UN-Forum-on-Inter net.html ("Following up on an
agreement reached on thre Contentious topic of Internet governance at thre November
World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Tunis. United Nations Secretar
-
General Koii Annan announced he would create a forum for 'a more inclusive dialog'
on Internet poliw
."
).
168. See Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development, Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 888 U.N.T.S. 179 (creating the
Organisation tor Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD")): see also About
the Organisationfor Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD, http://www.occd.org/
pagesi0,3417,en_36734052_36734103 1 1 1 1 1,00.html (last visited May 25, 2012)
(describing the OECD). The OECD was founded in the early 1960s to stimulate
economic progress and world trade. See About the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, sopra.
169. See OECD, supra note 32, 1[1[ 25-26 (presenting thre purposes of the
principles); see also Soma et al., supra note 41, at 529 (mentioning the applications of
the OE)CD) Guidelines).
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Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows
of Personal Data and the Communiqu6 on Principles for
Internet Policy-Making contain guidelines and principles that
stress privacy and freedom of expression as important norms
that should be preserved. 7 The OECD focuses on eight privacy
principles: (1) Collection Limitation, (2) Data Quality, (3)
Purpose Specification, (4) Use Limitation, (5) Security
Safeguards, (6) Openness, (7) Individual Participation, and (8)
Accountability.1 71 The guidelines eventually led to the European
Union Data Protection Directive ("EU Directive"), which stated
as a basic proposition that the joint goals of protecting personal
privacy and avoiding restrictions on the free flow of personal
data based on privacy concerns among member countries are
essential to the evolution of the integrated market in Europe 172
These groups recognize the significance of countries
committing to a set of core principles.173 By taking norms and
standards used by technological and engineering groups and
applying them to questions of internet governance, they have
provided for their widespread dissemination and adoption.1 74 In
170. See OECD, supra note 32, 1[1[ 7-22 (listing the guidelines); see also OE CD,
COMMUNIQUE ON PR1NCIPIES FOR INTERNET POIC-MAKING (2011), av ,ilable ad
http://w occ.org/dataoecd/40/21/48289796.pdf [hereinafter OECD
COMMUN1QIL] (presenting principles on Internet policymaking).
171. See OECDL) (OMMUNI@j1F, supra note 170 (presenting principles on internet
policrmaking); Somna et al., supra note 41, at 529 (listing the eight privacy principles
established by the OECD).
172. Council Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 OJ. L
281; see Raymond T. Ninuner, European Data Protection. 1 INFo. L.. Nov. 2011, § 8:82
(explaining the basic proposition of the European Union Data Protection Directive("EU Directive") ).
173. See OECD COMIMLNIQUL, supa note 170 (adopting a set of principles); see
also World Summit on the Information Society, sopra note 33, 11 13-36 (presenting
principles that should be adopted in developing a systen of internet governance);
About the Internet Governance Forum. supra note 167 (Citing critical internet norms and
standards that should be followed). In 2012, the European Commission proposed a
mnajor refornm of the EU legal ft-ainework of the protection of personal data to
strengthen online privacy rights. See Protection of Personal Data. EUR. (OMMISSION.
http:i/ec.europa.euijusticeidata-protection/indexen.htm (last updated Apr. 4,
2012).
174. See OECD (IOMLNIQUL, supa note 170 (adopting a set of principles); see
also World Summit on the Information Society, supra note 33, 13-36 (outlining
principles for adoption in developing a syseten of internet governance); About the
Internet Governance Forum. supra note 167 (Citing critical Internet nliiLs and standards
that should be lollowed).
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turn, the principles of openness, freedom of expression,
transparency, and privacy became ubiquitous on the Internet.1 75
3. Applying Norms to Policy: Governmental Agencies
In the United States, governmental agencies such as the
FCC and the FTC have adopted policies that reflect the norms
to which groups such as the Internet Engineering Task Force
("IETF") were committed.176 In 1998, the FTC introduced five
core principles of privacy protection: (1) Notice awareness, (2)
Choice/consent, (3) Access/ participation, (4)Integritvsecurity,
and (5) Enforcement/redress. 7 7 The principles were the result
of a series of reports, guidelines, and model codes that represent
widely accepted norms concerning fair information practices.17 ,
As the Internet Society has stated, "users expect internet traffic
to be conveyed in a manner that is independent of its source,
content, or destination, and in a manner that respects their
privacy." 179 Likewise, governmental agencies have accepted these
principles and crafted their policies in a way that respects
them. 1 so
175. See e.g., World Summit on the Information Society, sopra note 33, 11 13-36
(accepting the norms of openness, freedom of expression, transparency, and privacy as
established principles and applying them to a broad concept of internet governance);
see also ILetter from Facebook to the FTC, supra note 137 (asserting that these principles
mtl be respected and followed).
176. See Sylvain, supra note 38, at 216 ("The law governing tire provision of
wireline broadband serv ice ... amounts to little more than a policy of liberal deference
to Internet engineers, programmers, and entrepreincurs."); see also Saul Hansell,. C C
Vote Sets Precedent on Lufettered Web Usage. N.Y. TIMLS, Aug. 2, 2008, at (1 (discussing
how the FCC sought to make ensure that Comcast was lollowing industry practices).
177. See FE. TRADE COIM'N, PRIVAY ONI.INE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7-11
(1998), available at http:'//vww.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf (listing the F('s
privacy principles); see also Soma et al., sopra note 41, at 53) (presenting the live core
principles of privacy protection).
178. See FLD. TRKADL (IOMM'N, supra note 177, at ii ("In this report, the
Commission summarizes widely-accepted principles regarding information collection,
use, and dissemination."); W. Scott Blackmer et aL., Online Consuoter Data Priva
Regulation in the US., 3 ELLCTRONIC BANKING L. & COm. RLP. 1. 1-3 (1999) (describing
the background behind the FTC privacy principles).
179. INTLRNET SOC'Y, supra note 32, at 4; see Citron, supra note 70, at 834-37
(discussing individuals' privacy expectations for the government).
180. See e.g., IED. TRA)E COMM'N, sopra note 137, at 3 (using accepted Internet
norms in proposing a friamework for protecting privacy on the Internet); FLD. TRADE
(COMM'N, supra note 177, at 7 (presenting privacy principles based on accepted Internet
norms).
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In 2010, the FTC released a proposed privacy framework. 8 '
The proposal was intended to inform policymakers, including
Congress, as they develop policies and potential legislation
regarding privacy, and also to guide industry as it develops more
effective self-regulatory guidelines and practices.18 2 The proposal
also documented the FTC's longstanding efforts to protect
privacy and called for the systemic implementation of
procedural safeguards.18 " The FTC received over 400 comments
on the proposal from individuals, organizations, and
corporations including Facebook, Google, IBM, and
Microsoft. I,4 The majority of these responses applauded the
FTC's efforts to reexamine the balance between the public's
interest in sharing information against their interest in
maintaining control over that information.1 85
Some government authorities rationalize that security also
is an established internet norm that they are seeking to preserve
when contemplating internet regulations. 1,1 In almost all of
these cases, however, "security" refers to network security rather
than physical security. 18 7 For example, the OECD Guidelines on
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data mention that having security safeguards is an important
181. See FED. TRADL OMM'N, supra note 137. at 39: see also Richard L. Santalesa,
What's Next for the FTCs Proposed Privacy Framework?, INFO. I GRP. (Mar. 23, 2011),
http://ww. inolawgrioup.com /2011/ 03/ a ticles/data -privacy-la -or-regulation/whats-
next-for-Lthe-fcs-proposed-privacy-fl-aiework/ (discussing the proposed privacy
framework).
182. See FED. TRADE (OMM'N, supra note 137, at i.
183. See id. at v, 3-19 (explaining the efforts of the FTC to protect privacy, and
stating that: "Companies also should implement and enforce procedurally sound
privacy practices throughout their organizations ... the time has come for industry to
implement them systeinaticall,.").
184. See Santalesa, supra note 181 (describing the groups that responded to the
FTC's Proposed Privacy Framework); see also Letter fhon Facebook to the FTC, supra
note 137 (providing an example of the ty pes of responses).
185. See Santalesa, supra note 181 (examining the responses of organizations such
as Google, IBM. and Facebook, and finding Lhat while there were soie criticisms,
generally, these companies agreed that the FTC was on the right track); see also Letter
from Facebook to the FTC, supra note 137 (agreeing that the groups must reexamine
the balance bersween tiecdom of expression and privacy).
186. See ijnf/a Part 11 (examining specific events in Egypt, the United Kingdom,
and the United States).
187. See OECD, sup a note 32 11 (referring to the security of personal data);
World Summit on [IIe Inoirmation Sociey, supra note 33, 1[ 79 (asserting that security
measures should protect privacy and personal data).
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principle.188 The guidelines deal with the protection of personal
data by reasonable security safeguards, however, and therefore
support a privacy norm rather than a security norm.18
Additionally, the WGIG refers to the stable and secure
functioning of the Internet when discussing security. 1911
According to the group, security is the protection of privacy and
other human rights. 191 The WGIG goes further to warn that
measures taken by governments on grounds of security can lead
to violations of the provisions for freedom of expression as
contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in
the WSIS Declaration of Principles. 192
The FTC also refers to safety in its discussion on internet
principles.1 9" According to the FTC, the greatest safety risk is
presented by the posting of personal identifying information by
and about children.1-4 Additionally, the FTC mentions security
as a norm in the banking and financial industries, and limits the
use of the principle to protecting these industries' sensitive
information. 195 Notwithstanding these discrepancies, some
188. See ()FCD, supra note 32, 11 ("Personal data should be protected by
reasonable security .afeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access,
destruction, use, modilication or disclosure of data.").
189. See OE(CD, sup)a note 32, 1[ 56 (discussing security in terms of protecting
privacy).
190. See World Summit on the Inlormation Society, supra note 33, 6 ("In
particular, the WSIS principle relating to the stable and secure functioning of the
Internet was judged to be of pariamount importance.").
191. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl., G.A. Res. 217 (1II) A,
U.N. Doc. AiResi217(111) (Dec. 10, 1948) (recognizing freedom of speech as a
fundamental human right); see also World Summit on the Information Society, supra
note 33, 79 (asserting that security measures should provide for the "appropriate
protection of privacy, personal data and other human rights"); WSIS Declaration of
Principles, supra note 149, 1[ 55 (reaffirming the WSIS's commitment to the principles
of freedom of the press and freedom of information).
192. See World Summit on the Information Society, supra note 33. 1 24 (warning
that any action taken by governments on the ground of security may violate
international treaties).
193. See FFD. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 177, at ii ("These core principles require
that ... the data collector take appropriate steps to ensure the security and integrity of
any inlormation collected.").
194. See id. at 5 (stating that sites should assure that children's data is secure from
unathorized uses or disclosures).
195. See id. at 16 ("Only the banking and financial industry association guidelines,
and the individual retierence services guidelines, make any reference to security issues.
These guidelines call generally for appropriate security procedures, including the
limitation of employee access to data.").
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government groups continue to maintain that security is an
established internet standard that should be respected.
II. CURRIENT EVENTS ANID GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES:
EGYPT. THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND TIE UNITED STA TES
As internet use has become more prevalent, governments
have begun to formulate procedures regarding internet
interference. Part II describes the current governmental policies
in Egypt, the United Kingdom, and the United States regarding
internet and, specifically, social media regulation. Part A
discusses attempts made by the Egyptian government to control
the Internet by examining the events of the summer of 2011.
Part B examines issues the UK government faced when
regulating social media sites both before and after the riots of
the summer of 2011. Part C analyzes problems that have arisen
in the United States as the government tries to determine its
role in regulating social media.
A. Egypt: The Revolution of 2011 and Its Aftermath
"Freedom of expression means you can speak up, criticize,
and write what you want, as long as it is not against the
law."
-Hosni Mubarak, Jormer President oJEgypt%
Although the provisions of the Constitution of Egypt and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
seemingly provided for the freedom of expression and privacy,
the imposition of emergency law in Egypt severely limited their
reach.9 7 Emergency law was imposed in Egypt in 1967, allowing
196. MOUSTAFA, supra note 109, at 118 (quoting an inteview with formner
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak).
197. CONSTITU TION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 1I Sept. 1971, (Is (Umendd.
May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007, arts. 47-49: ICCPR, supra note 108, arts.
17, 19, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177-78; see NATHAN j. BROW N, THE R41U-E OF AW IN THE ARAB
WORLD: COURTS IN EGYPT AN) THE GULF 122-25 (1997) (discussing cmergency law in
Egypt); see also Sarah CarT,Journalists Challenge Egypt's Exceptional Laws at Seminar. DALLY
STAR (Egypt) (Aug. 1, 2008, 2:00 AM), http://www.dailysIregypt.com/
article.aspx?ArticleID-15464 (last visited May 25, 2012) ("These laws have gradually
been added to over tl[e years so that now you have layers and layers of oppressive
legislation.").
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the government to rule under a state of emergency' In May
1980, the state of emergency was lifted, but following the
assassination of President Anwar AI-Sadat, it was reimposed on
October 6, 1981, and has been regularly renewed since then.199
Many constitutional rights were suspended, police powers were
extended, and the government was given the power of
censorship.20- 1 N,\Vhile the declared objective of the legislation was
to better enable the government and security forces to uncover
militant Islamists, the laws effectively allowed the government to
maintain their power.201The growth of the Internet in Egypt reflected the young
population's "thirst for new technology."2112 Social networking
provided many Egyptians with a venue to express themselves,
organize around political and social causes, and circulate
198. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, sapra note 103, at 39 ("Egypt's Emergency Law
(Law No. 162 of 1958 as amended), in effect almost continuously since 1967, gives the
president broad powers .... "); see also Submission from thre Intl Comm'n of.Jurists
(I(J) to the Universal periodic Review of Egypt, 7th Sess. of the Working Grp. on the
Universal Periodic Review (Feb. 8-19, 2010), U.N. Human Rights Council 1 (Aug.
2009), available at hIIp:// vw.icj.org/IMG/UPRStbmission-Egypt.pdf [hereinafter 1(
Submission] (providing an introduction to the emergency law in Egypt).
199. See IC Submission, supra note 198, at 1 (tracing the use of the emergenc
law); see also HUM'AAN RIGHTS WATCH, supa note 103, at 39 n.152 ("The Emergency Law
was imposed in 1967, in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war. It was lifted briefly in May
1980 after the implementation of the Camp David accords, then reinstated after
President Anwar al-Sadat's assassination in October 1981.").
200. See Carr, sopra note 197 ("The emergency law in force since the declaration
of the state of emergency grants the administrative authorit powers to search, arrest
and detain individuals without the supelvision of judicial bodics."); VWilliams, supra
note 112, at A13 ("No potential reform measure had been more anticipated than
cancellation of the emergenc law, which permits indefinite detention without tial and
hearings of civilians by military courts, prohibits gatherings of more than five people,
and limits speech and association."); see also ICj Submission, supra note 198, at 2-4
(detailing the abuses of power that have occurred under emergency law).
201. See MOLSTAtA, supra note 109, at 137 (criticizing the emergenc laws); see also
H-MAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 103, at 39 ("Law 97/1992, known as the Law to
Combat Terrorism, gives the government broader powers to combat political violence,
and criminalizes forms of non-violent opposition.").
202. See Noam Cohen, In Egypt, a ThirstfJor Technology and Progress, N.Y. TIMES, july
21, 2008, at C3 ("In Egypt, where half the population is under 25, there is a thirst for
new technology and a chance to escape the backward conditions its young people have
been born into."); see al0 Rumors ofa Facebook Block Persist in Egypt, sopra note I ("The
social networking powerhouse has become a venue for bloggers to express thenselves.
organize around political and social causes, and circulate information that would be
considered taboo in other media.").
1522 FORDHAM LTTERNATIONAL LAIWJOURNAL [Vol. 35:1485
information. 0 ', For example, in April of 2008, activists in Egypt
used Facebook to organize strikes and protests days before
municipal elections. 2 4 Facebook groups played a significant role
in recruiting supporters and increasing turnout for the
demonstrations.205
After the strike, the Egyptian government asked mobile
phone companies to block service to certain subscribers under
the pretext of security.2°ff Egyptian authorities also threatened to
block access to the Facebook site within the country. 207 In
February 2009, the telecommunications company Vodafone
revealed that it had handed over communications data to the
Egyptian authorities in response to government demands.208 The
203. See Rumors of a lacebook Block Persist in Egypt, supra note 1 ("The social
networking powerhouse has become a venue for bloggers to express themselves,
organize around political and social causes, and circulate infirmation that would be
considered taboo in other media."); see also Mariarn Fain, Egyptian Political Dissent Unites
Through Facebook, WALL ST. J., May 5, 2008, at A9 ("Facebook [in Egypt] has evolved
into more than just a social networking Web site: it is one of the latest tools for political
dissent in Egypt.").
204. See Rimors oJ'a Facebook Block Persist in Egypt, supra note I ("The general strike
that unfolded in Egypt on April 6 was advertised on a Facebook group [called the April
6 Youth Movement]. which attracted more than 70,000 members and played a
significant role in recruiting supporters and increasing turnout for the
dCmonstrations."); see also Fain, sup a note 203, at A9 (discussing the popularity of the
April 6 Youth Movement group).
205. See Rimors of a Facebook Block Persist in Egypt, sopra note I (describing a
popular Facebook group that played a large role in recruiting supporters and
increasing turnout tor the demonstrations); see also Fain, supra note 203, at A9
(discussing the role that Facebook played in organizing for the strike).
206. See Cynthia Johnston, Egypt Asks Mlobile Firms to Bar Anony mous U,
REUTERS, May 5, 2008, http://ca.reuters.com/articlc/technolog)yNws/id(AL0562
68520080505 (reporting on Egypt's request to mobile phone companies to block
service to anonymous subscribers as a public security measure); see also OPENNET
INITIATI\VE, supra note 104, at 4 ("Vodafoe revealed in February 2009 that it handed
over communications data to the Egyptian authorities that may have been used to help
identi rioters who were protesting during the April 2008 bread crisis.").
207. See Rumors of a Facebook Block Persist in Egypt, supra note 1 ("Egyptian
authorities are threatening to block access to Facebook within the country.. the
rumors continue to circulate and the potential to make Facebook disappear from
computer monitors across Egypt is real."); see also OPENNET INITIATIVE, sup a note 104,
at 4 (stating that the Egyptian government considered blocling Facebook after the
April 6 strike).
208. See HChmi Nomnan. Can They Hear Me Now? (On ICT Regulations, Governments,
and T-rrspa r'), OPENNET INITIATIVE (Feb. 24, 2009), http:/iopennet.net/blog/
2009/02/can-they-hCar-ime-no-on -ict-regulations-governmeLnts-and-transparency ("On
February 11, Vodatfne's global head of content standards ... revealed that VodafonC
handed over communications data to the Egyptian authorities in response to
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data may have been used to help identify people involved in the
2008 riots.20 In January 2011, people began using Facebook and
social media to organize protests around Egypt.21°1 On January
25, 2011, tens of thousands of protesters gathered in and around
Tahrir Square in Cairo, demanding an end to the rule of
President Hosni Mubarak.211 Thousands of others gathered in
other cities around Egypt. 1 2 These protests criticized the abuses
of the police and demanded changes, including the end of
emergency law and changes to the term limits of the
presidency213 On January 26, 2011, the government shut down
internet access for most of the country for five days. 2 14 Protesters
continued to find ways to circumvent the government ban and
news outlets around the world rushed to find ways to get
information about what was happening in Egypt.215
government demands."); see also OPENNET INITIATIT, sapra note 104, at 4 (reporting
that Vodafone handed over comimunications data to the Egyptian authorities that may
have been used to help identily protesters rom the April 2008 strike).
209. See Noman, supra note 208 (stating that the data may have been used to help
identify rioters); see also OPLNNLT INITIATIVE, supra note 104, at 4 (explaining how cell
phone information was used to help identify participants of the April 2008 protests).
210. See Ktrcem iFahim & Mona El-Naggar, Across Egypt, Protests Direct Fur at
Leade, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, at Al (describing the protests in Egypt); Jennifer
Preston, Aovemenrt Began with OC ag-e and a Facebook Page that Gave It an Outlet, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 6, 2011, at A10 (discussing a Facebook group titled "We Are All Khaled
Said" that helped spread information about Egyptian abuses and indicating that
Khaled Said was an Egyptian who was tortured and killed by Egyptian police).
211. See Fahimn & El-Naggar, supra note 210, at A1 (describing the Egyptian
protests); see also Ahinir Ahmed. Thousands Protest in Egypt CNN, Jan. 25. 2011,
http: /article s.cnn.com/ 2011-01-25 /world egypt.protests I street-protests-thousands-
protes -economiic-policies?_s-PM:W\ ORLD (reporting on the protests).
212. See Fahirn & El-Naggar, supra note 210. at Al (describing thre protests); see
also Ahmed, supra note 211 (providing information regarding the protests).
213. See Fahirn & El-Naggar, supra noe 210, at Al (describing thre demands of the
protesters); see also Ahmed, supra note 211 (reporting on the protests).
214. See Matt Richtel, Egypt Halts Most Internet and Cell Service, and Scale oj Shatdown
Surprises Experts. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2011, at A13 (describing the shutdown as
unprcccdented in scope and scale"); see also Mark Milian, Reports Say Egypt Web
Shutdown Is Coordinated, Extensive, CNN (Jan. 28, 2011), http://articles.cnn.corin201 I-
01-28/tech/egypt.intcrinct.shutdown 1 social-media-egypt-web-instant-messaging?_s-
PM:TE( IH (reporting on the internet shutdown).
215. See Richtel, supra note 215, at A13 ("Online activists inside and outside the
countr) passed along information about how to work around the shutdown, like using
dial-up Internet connections in other countries."); see also Christopher Rhoads &
(eoffrey A. Fowler, Egypt Shuts Down Internet, C.lphone S- t Ace, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29,
2011, http://onlinc.wsj.coi/articlc/SB100014240527487039566045761104533713697
40.hLnl (describing ways in which activists tried to spread news after [ire Internet was
shut down).
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Following weeks of popular protests and pressure, President
Hosni Mubarak resigned from office on February 11, 2011.2L
Since then, a military council led by Field Marshal Mohammed
Hussein Tantawi, the chairman of the Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces, has been exercising interim power.217 In March
2011, a new constitution was declared218
While the military has promised reform, in September of
2011, the council announced it would continue to enforce the
emergency law into 2012.2 19 In November, protests began again,
this time criticizing the military council's failure to hand over
power to an elected group of citizens.22 Protesters also decried
the heavy-handed tactics of the military council in responding to
the demonstrations, comparing them to those used during the
Mubarak era.2 21 After several days of violence and unrest, the
civilian cabinet of ministers resigned. 222 The ruling military
council agreed to speed up the transition to civilian rule, and
216. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Alubarak Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011, at AI
(confirming that Mubarak stepped down from power); Anthony Shadid, Egyptian
AMilitary Dissolves We'ak Parliamet. N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, at Al (explaining the
handover of power).
217. See Shadid, sopra note 21 6, at AI (detailing the military leaders that took over
after Presiden Mubarak stepped down); see also David D. Kirpatrick, Egypt Unclear on
Timetable of Power Transfe, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5. 2011, at A8 (discussing how the
militarv has lailed to hand over power to the people).
218. CONSTITU TIONA I)ECARATION OF THE ARAB ILEPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Mar. 20,
2011. available at http://www.cgypt.gov.eg/english/laws/cotimtittionidefalIt.aspx; see
Neil MacFarquhar, Egypts Votes Approve Con sittional Chan esfor Quick Elections. N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2011, at A4 (reporting on the nev constitution).
219. See Egyptian ilitary Institutes New VMedia Restrictions, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT
jOt' RNAIISTS, (Sept. 13, 2011), http:/icpj.org/2011/09/egyptian-military-instittes-
ncw-icdia-restriction.php (reporting on new media restrictions and confirming that
the emergency law remains in effect); see also Kirkpatrick, sopra note 217, at A8
(commenting that the emergency law continues to be in eftfct and hoping tir its end).
220. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypts Cabinet Offers to Resigr, as Potess Rage, Nov
22, 2011, at Al (describing the new protests in Egypt); see also Tamim Elyan & Edmund
Blair, Egyptiars Protest at Arenn, Clashes Kill at Least 12, REUTERS, Nov. 20, 2011,
http: / /wN,.rcers.com/article/2011 /11 /20/us-egypL-protests-
idUSTRE7AI0EC20111120 (reporting on the November protests).
221. See Kirkpatrick, sopra note 220, at A I (describing the tactics of tihe militar) in
responding to protests): see also Elyan & Blair, supra note 220 (discussing the reasons
why protests occurred again in November).
222. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 220, at Al (describing the cabinet's response to
the protests); see also Eg3;pt's ViilitaU Accepts Cabinet Resignation, CNN (Nov. 22, 2011,
12:53 PM), hItp://news.blogs.cnii.com/2011/1/22/report-egptian-officials-reach-
deal-on-national-governminent/ (reporting on the resignation of the cabinet).
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elections took place as planned on November 28 and 29, 2011,
wvith Egyptians turning out in large numbers223
While social media may not have been responsible for the
revolution in Egypt or its continued repercussions, it has
certainly made a significant contribution.22 4 The people of Egypt
have grasped the possibilities of the medium and have adopted
social media norms to effectuate change and demand legitimate
reform.2 25 In this type of environment, the Egyptian government
can no longer avoid making changes226
B. United Kingdom: The Role of Social Media in the London Riots and
the Debate over Super-Injunctions
There has been a particularly strong clash between the
rights of privacy and the freedom of expression in the United
Kingdom. 227 The debate has spread to the issuance of super-
223. See Kirkpatrick, sopra note 220, at Al (discussing the planned elections); see
also Charles Levinson ct al., Egypt's Voters Cast Historic Ballot, X\ALL ST. 1.. Nov. 29, 2011,
at A8 (reporting on the Egyptian vote).
224. See Fatma Naib, On/ire Actvism Fuels Egypt Protest, ALJAZLERA, Jan. 28. 2011.
http:/'/Asvw.ajazeera.com/news/middlceast/2011 /01/2011128102253848730.html
(discussing the influence of social media on the protests); Jillian York, The Future oj
Egypt's Internet, -XIJAZEEVA (Feb. 1, 2011, 10:45 AM), http:/ / v\v.ajazeera.com/
indepth/opinion/2011/02/20112174317974677.html ("Furthermore, the degree to
which online communicatins were used in Egypt for organising prior to the blackout
is simply unprecedented; though electronic communication may not have catalyzed the
popular uprising, they certainly helped it along, perhaps even accelerated it.").
225. See Ruoaor of a Facebook Block Persist in Egypt, sopra note I ("There is no
freedom of expression and there is no real mass media where we can speak our
opinions: so we go to the Internet to speak our opinions wvith more freedom and
increased range." (quoting WaLeed KoraYkcm, a student in Cairo)); see also Preston,
supra note 210, at Al0 ("Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and cellphones made it easy for
human rights advocates to get out the news and for people to spread and discuss their
outrage .. in a country where freedom of speech and the right to assemble were
limited and the government monitored newspapers and state television.").
226. See Kirkpauick, supra note 217, at Al (" [Mubarak] wvas toppled by a radically
new force in regional politics-a largely secular, nonviolent, youth-led democracy
movement that brought Egypt's liberal and Islamist opposition groups together fbor the
first time under its banner."); see also David D. Kirkpatrick, Deal to Hasten Transitior Is
jeered at Cairo Protests, N.Y. TIMES. Nov. 23, 2011, at Al (discussing how the militar y
council has tried to strike deals with various parts of the political elite, to no avail).
227. See Claire Cain Miller & Ravi Somaiya, Free Speech on Twitter Faces Test, N.Y.
TIMLS, May 23, 2011, at B1 (discussing the problems posed by Twitter); see also MULIS
& SCOTT, supra note 83, at 12-22 (describing problems in the British libel regime).
525
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injunctions by British courts228 For example, in May 2011, it was
revealed that the UK soccer star Ryan Giggs had obtained a
super-injunction to prevent the media from discussing a
rumored affair.22i Twitter users responded by revealing his name
on the site. 23 Giggs sued Twitter, attempting to force the
company to give him the names of the anonymous users who
posted his name.2 41 For its part, Twitter has stood firmly by its
protection of established internet norms. 232 Analysts have
stressed the broad implications of this debate. 233, Privacy
protections are vital for individuals involved in a social
movement like the Egyptian revolution.2 34
228. See Miller & Somaiya, .sp note 227, at B (discussing the problem posed by
Twitter); see also Steven Doughty, We Will Not Be Gagged, M4'ud: As R' an Giggs Is Naated
in Parliament as Cheating Star After IW"eeks of Legal Face, APs Launch a Defiant Aessage,
DAIHY MAII (U.K.), May 24, 2011, http:/iwww.dailvmail.co.ukinevs/article- 1389841i
Ryan-Giggs-named-Parliament-cheating-super-iiijunction-star.html (reporting on the
super-i 'i junction controversy).
229. See )oughty, supra note 228 (reporting on the super-injunction controversy);
Sarah Lyall, ParliamentJoins the Fray as Twitter Tests a Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2011, at
A4 ("The tough ruling banned anyone fr om reporting his name,. her name, the
supposed alfair, even the very existence of the order itself.").
230. See Miller & Sonaiya, supra notc 228, at BI (" [T]cns of thousands of Internet
users have flouted thre injunction by revealing his name on Twitter. Facebook and
online soccer lorums, sites that blur the definition of the press and are virtually
impossible to police."); see also Lyall, supra note 229, at A4 ("The clash betwcen old-
media law and new-media reality soon descended into a chaotic farce, with Mr. Giggs's
name appearing in some 75,000 postings over the weekend, even as British news
organizations were still legally forbidden to print it.").
231. See Doughty, supra note 228 (reporting on a court order obtained by Giggs
demanding that Twitter reveal the identities of the anonymous users who had posted
the messages); Lyall, supra note 229, at A4 (discussing Ryan Giggs' lawycrs' statements
that they planned to sue Twitter to find tie people behind the initial posts).
232. See Miller & Somaiya, supra note 227, at B 1 (quoting Twitter lounder Biz
Stone and Twitter general counsel Alex Macgillivray: "Our position on fiecdom of
expression carries with it a mandate to protect our users' right to speak freely and
preserve their ability to contest having their private information revealed."); Jillian C.
York & (indy Cohn, Twitte, Free Speech, Super-junctions and the Streisand Effect,
ELECTRONic FRONTILR FOUND., May 24, 2011, https://www.et.org/ dceplinks/201/
05/twvitter-and- ree-speech-case-super-injunction (applauding Twitter's policy of
notiting its users when the US government deinands intormation about Twitter users).
233. See Miller & Soinaiya, supra note 227, at Bi ("If you step back, that sane sort
of protection is really vital to have in place when you're talking about the individuals
involved in a revolution or a social movement like the Arab Spring." (quoting Thomas
R. Burke, chairman of the media law practice at Davis Wright Triemaine)); York &
Cohn, supra note 232 (stating that super-injunctions are a lorm of prior censorship and
are not permitted under international human rights law).
234. See PLTER SWIRL. (TR. FOR M. PROGRESS. SOCIAL NETWORKS, PRIVACY. AND
FREEDOM OF _kSSOCIATION 1-2 (2011), (U ailable at http:i/ww.americanprogress.orgi
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The clash between internet norms, such as privacy and
freedom of expression, and the government's desire to rely on a
security rationale reached its peak several months after the
super-injunction controversy.235 In early August 2011, several
months after the events in Egypt, riots broke out in the United
Kingdom after a man was fatally shot by police as they tried to
arrest him on suspicion of committing a crime.2 3, Rioters used
Facebook, Twitter, and BlackBerry Messenger to organize2 37
More than 1900 people were arrested and damages were
estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of pounds.2- During
the riots, two London members of Parliament called for a
BlackBerry Messenger curfew, proposing a shutdown of the
service at certain times of the day.2 9
issues/2011 i02/pdi/socialnetwvorks-privacy.pdl (stressing the importance of privacy
protections for people using social media); see also OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note
104, at 3 (discussing how bloggers and internet users have been arrested after
criticizing the government via social media).
235. See Riots in Tottenham After Mark Duggan Shooting Protest, BBC NWVS, Aug. 7,
2011, http://Nw,.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england -lodon-14434318 (reporting on the UK
riots); see also Ravi Somaiya, London Sees T;;n Peris Conve"gng to Fuel Riot, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2011, at A4 (commenting on the undi rlying causes of thc London riots).
236. See Riots in Tottenham After Mark Duggan Shooting Protest. supra note 235
(describing the source of the protest); see also Somaiya, supra note 235, at A4 ("The
episode in Tottenham began as a small and peaceful march, in which residents
gathrercd outside a police station to protest the killing of a local man, Mark Duggan, in
a shooting by police officers last week. Scotland Yard has said that Mr. I)uggan... was
the subject of a 'pre-planncd operation' by officers.
237. See John F. Burns & Eric Ptanncr, British Primne Winister Faces Questioning in
House of Commons over Rioting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2011, at A4 (quoting Prime Minister
Cancron as stating that the government was working on measures to stop rioters from
using social media and that he believed it was "right to stop people communicating via
these Web sites and services when we know they are plotting violence, disorder and
criminality"); Juliette Garsidc, Rioters' Use of Social VMedia Throws Telecorns Firms into
Spotlight. OBSERVLR (U.K.), Aug. 20, 2011, at 37 ("After the overthrow of Hosni
Mubarak in Egypt and this summer's looting in England, there is no longer any doubt
about the speed with which large crowds can be mobilised on to the streets.").
BlackBerry Messenger is an application that allows tor instant messaging between users
of the BlackBerry phone. See BBM Features, BILACKBERRY, http:/ius.blackbery.con/
apps-sofLware/blackbcrymcssenger/ (last visited May 25, 2012).
238. See Laura Smith-Spark, Britain s Suspected Rioters Face Courts as Order Restored,
CNN (Aug. 12, 2011, 9:19 PM), http://edition.cnn.con/201 1 /WORLI)ieuropei08i
12/uk.riots/ (detailing the damage that resulted fhom the UK riots); see also James Ball,
London s High Streets Count the Cost of the Riots, GUARLAN (U.K), Aug. 8, 2011,
http:/iwiv.guardian c oukiuk/201 1 iaugi08/london-iriots-cost-retail-business
(describing the financial damage done by rioting and looting).
239. See Garside. supra note 237, at 37 (reporting a proposal by two London
members of Parliament calling for a BlackBerr, Messenger curfew, shutting down
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Afterwards, the police commissioner testified before
members of Parliament that the police considered switching off
social messaging sites but discovered that they did not have the
legal authority to do so. 241 Instead, police accessed encrypted
social messaging sites in order to thwart planned riots.24 1 After
the riots ceased, the govermnent announced plans to review
police powers, including those to interv ene in mobile
communications .242
During a special debate on the riots, UK Prime Minister
David Cameron told Parliament that "when people are using
social media for violence we need to stop them. ' 241 A week later,
Prime Minister Cameron met with the makers of Blackberry,
Facebook, and Twitter to discuss ways to limit the use of social
media during periods of civil unrest2 44 After being met with
charges of hypocrisy and censorship, the prime minister backed
off, stating that the government had no intention of restricting
internet services, and that the meeting instead would focus on
service from 6:00 PM to 6:00 AM); see also Hackers Deface Blackberty Blog Site over UKRiot
Mess, GMA NE./vs ONLINE (Aug. 10, 2011, 10:23 AM), http:/iwww.gmanetwork.com/
news /story/ 228960 /scitech /hackers-detace-blackberry-blog -site-over-uk-riot-mess
("Tottenham MP I)avid Lammy was among those calling for the BlackBer7 Messenger
system (BBM) to be shut down to prevent protesters using it to organize thcmsl ves.").
240. See Vikram Dodd, Police Accessed BlackBern Aessages to Thwat Planned Riots,
(, ARDIAN (U.K.), Aug. 16, 2011, at 7 (reporting that police had considered switching
off social messaging sites): Garside, supra note 237, at 37 (explaining that police (lid
not seek authority to close down social media sites).
241. See I)odd, supra note 240, at 7 (" [Police] were able to use details gained from
the seized phones to give officers 'live time monitoring' of BBM and also Twitter."); see
also Garside, supra note 237. at 37 ("Police have already told MPs that they
contemplated seeking authority to close down Twitter and other services, but that
monitoring communications on these channels allowed them to identify the next
targets and send officers to protect the Olympic site,. Westfield shopping centre and
Oxlord Street.").
242. See Burns & Ptanner, sup a note 237, at A4 (discussing the UK government's
plans to respond to the riots); Garside, supra note 237. at 37 (mentioning the
government's plans to meet with social messaging companies).
243. Eric Ptanner, Cameron Exploring Crackdown on Social VMedia After Riots, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011, http://wNnytimes.com/2011/08/12/worll/curopc/12ihL-
social 12.html (quoting the response by Prime Minister Cameron); see Garside, supra
note 237, at 37 (quoting Prime Minister Cameron).
244. See Ravi Somaiya, In Britain, a Meeting on Limiting Social Media, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2011, at A4 (discussing the results of the meeting); see alsojosh Halliday,
Government Backs Down on Plan to Shot Down Twitter and Facebook in Crises, GLARDLX\
(U.X.), Aug. 25, 2011, IItp:/ / ww.guarian.co.uk/iedia/2011/aug/25/governmcnt-
plan-shut-twitter-facebook (reporting on the meeting).
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how law enforcement could better use Twitter and Facebook in
emergencies.2 45 While some felt that the government and police
should be permitted to interfere with communication networks
in certain situations, others worried that any "draconian new
measures in the [United Kingdom] would undermine the fight
for open communication that western democracies championed
during the upheavals in the Middle East."24
C. United States: The San Francisco BART Incident, Data Collection
Debates, and the Freedom of Speech
In the wake of the UK riots, problems arose in San
Francisco, California, when transit police shot and killed a knife-
wielding homeless man on a train platform.2 47 Public anger over
the shooting sparked protests2 48 Demonstrators stopped trains,
in some cases climbing on top of them, and organized their
protests by smartphone. 24- Bay Area Rapid Transit ("BART"),
the operator of San Francisco's subway, suspended service on its
own mobile network for three hours, not allowing passengers to
245. See Ptanner, supra note 243 (" [Caniron's] call for curbs drew protests rom
free-speech campaigners, saying they were reminiscent of moves by Arab rilers to block
digital communications during anti-goveirnent uprisings this year."); see also Halliday,
supra note 244 (reporting that human rights groups sent an open letter warning that
powers restricting the internet could be susceptible to abuse and undermine iee
speech).
246. Garside, supra note 237, at 37 (criticizing government attempts to shutdown
social media and noting that social media had helped government authorities get
information and organize clean up); see Soinaiya, supra note 244, at A4 ("Some of the
nations that have been criticized by the West tor their own draconian crackdowns on
inconvenient freedoms of speech have watched Britain's recent struggles with barely
disguised glec.").
247. See Ned Potter, BART Protests: San Francisco Transit Cuts Cellphones to Thwart
Deorstato ", Fir st Amnendrnent Debate, ABC NF,\-, Aig. 16, 2011,
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/ bart-protes-san-fraincisco- Uansi-cu -cellphonCs-
prevcnt/sto1yid-14311444 (reporting on the Bay Area Rapid Transit ("BART")
incident); see also Zusha Elinson, After C'llphone Action, BART Faces Escalating Protests,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2011, at A2 1 (discussing the BART protests).
248. See Potter, supra note 247 (reporting on protcsts after the shooting); see also
Elinson, sopra note 247, at A21 ("The incident provoked a series of small protests that
drew little attcntion until Aug. 11, when the transit agenc took the unusual step of
shutting down cellphone service for several hours as activists prepared for another
rally." ).
249. See Potter, supra note 247 (describing the events leading up to BART's
actions); see also Elinson, supra note 247, at A21 (detailing [he way in which protestors
organized).
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make even emergency calls.2 5 ° Early reports indicated that BART
asked carriers to turn service off, but subsequent statements by
BART stated that staff shut down power and alerted the cell
carriers after the fact25'
The incident prompted many people to compare BART's
suspension of service to the actions taken in Egypt and
contemplated in the United Kingdom.2 52 Critics have noted that
the govermnent may enforce reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions on demonstrations or, in some situations,
prevent protests that present a clear and present danger. 253
Transit officials maintained that the actions were necessary to
protect public safety and that the transit passengers' right to
safety outweighed the rights of freedom of speech and
assemb.2 54
The Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") and other
groups filed an emergency petition asking the FCC to declare
BART's actions a violation of telecom laws, specifically the
250. See Potter, sup a note 247 (reporting on the shutdown); see also Elinson, sup a
note 247, at A21 ("BART approved the shutdown only alter Mr. Wakeman determined
that the action was legal under Brandenburg v. Ohio, a Supreme Court decision that
Lets the government punish speech that incites unlawful activity.").
251. See Eva Galperin, BART Pulls a MAubarak in San Francisco, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 12, 2011), https:/iww .eff.orgideeplinksi2011 i08/bart-pulls-
inubarak-san-francisco (commenting on the way BART handled the situation); see also
Potter, supra note 247 (reporting on the incident).
252. See Quinn Norton. BART's Cell-Senice Cuts: Not Egpt, But Not Quite America
Either, ATLANTIC, Aug. 26, 2011, http://ww.Ltheatlantic.con/technology/archive/
201 l/08/barts-cell-service-c uts-not-eg ¢pt-but-not-quite-america-eitheri2441 1/
(comparing BART to the actions of Mubarak); see also Galperin, supra note 251
(headlining that "BART Pulls a Mubarak in San Francisco").
253. Seeg e.g, Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648 (1984); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941);
see also Megan Delockery, BART's Cell Phone Shutdown: Protection of Public Safet, or
Infrirgement of Constitutional Rights ?, JETLAW: VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. I (Aug. 23, 2011),
http://wN.jetlaw.org/?p-7623 ("The ACLU noted that the government may entorce
reasonable tilie, place, and manner restrictions on demonstrations or, in some
situations, prevent protests that present a clear and present danger.").
254. See Delockery, supra note 253 ("BART officials claimed 'that they had the
right to [disrupt Cell phone service] because it is illegal to protest on trains, train
platforms, and outside of designated areas inside the stations.'"); see also Elinson, supra
note 247, at A21 ("BART approved the shutdown only after Mr. Wakeman determied
that the action was legal under Brandenburg v. Ohio, a Supreme Court decision that
lets the government punish speech that incites unlawful activity.").
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Communications Act of 1934.255 According to the EFF, BART
has proposed a new policy for use in future incidents that
clarified the extremely limited circumstances under which
BART may shut down serice.25 The EFF provided feedback and
in December 2011, BART released its new policy.257 The FCC
responded with a statement commending BART for taking steps
to adopt a new policy and stating that the FCC would soon
announce an "open, public process to provide guidance on
these issues."258
General concerns over violations of the Fourth Amendment
persist as govermnent agencies continue to seek information
from ISPs. 259 In 2007, telecommunications giant Verizon
informed Congress that it received over 90,000 requests for
customer data from law enforcement agencies each year.2t In
255. See Emergenc Petition in the Matter of the Petition of Public Knowledge Ct
al. or )eclaratory Ruling that Disconnection of Telecommunications Services Violates
the Communications Act (Fed. Conntc'ns C(omin'n Aug. 29, 2011), available at
http://ww.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/publiciniteresetitionF((BART.pdf
[hereinalter Emergency Petition for Declaratory Ruling]. The Electronic Frontier
Foundation ("EFF") is nonprofit organization founded in 1990 with the aim of
confr-onting issues regarding privacy, fiee speech, innovation, and consumer rights.
About EF, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://ww.eliorg about (last visited May
25, 2012).
256. See PROPOSED (ELL SERVICE INTERRUPTION POLICY. BA ARIEA RAPD TIRANSIT
(BART) (Oct. 19, 2011), available at http:/iww .bart.gov/docs/IARIT_Cell_
IntII erruptionPolicy.pdf (presenting a draft of a new cell phone interruption proposal).
257. See Trevor Timn, BART Board iembers Pledge to lmplement iViaw of EFF s
Recormendatons in Their Cell Phone Policy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 30,
2011), https: /'/,"w.efforg/ deeplink's /2011 1( /barL-board-members-pledge-
implement-many-effs-reconniendations-their-cell-phone (detailing the EFF's
recommendations); see also BAY AREA RIAPID TRANSIT, CELL SERVICE INTERRUPTION
POTICY (2011), availble at http:i/www.bart.gov/docsifinal-csip.pdl (presenting the
final version of BART's new cell phone interruption policy); Eva Galperin, BART
Considers a Cell Phonce Shutdown Policy, EL ECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 26, 2011),
https: //www.e.forg/ deeplinks /2011/ 10 /barL-considers-cell-phone-shutdown-policy
(welcoming BART's new policy).
258. Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Chairman julius Genachowski's
Statement on BART Policy Adoption (Dec. 1, 2011), available at
http:// transition.fcc.gov/ Daily-Releases /Daily-Busincss/ 2011/ dbl2Ol/DO(-
31 1310Al .pdl.
259. See Angwin, supra note 57, at Al (detailing recent clashes benween ISPs and
government authorities); Helft & Miller, supra note 58, at Al (reporting on the large
number of information requests made by government authorities).
260. See Angwin, supra note 57, at Al (describing the informnation requests made
by government authorities); Helft & Miller, supra note 57, at Al ("Vcrizon told
Congress in 2007 that it received some 90,000 such requests each year.").
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2009, Facebook stated that subpoenas and other orders were
arriving at the company at a rate of ten to twenty a day.2 61 In the
first half of 2010, Google counted more than 4200 of such
customer data requests.2 2 This legal pressure has resulted in
companies like Facebook, Google, and Twitter finding
themselves on the front lines of the war between government's
security considerations and Fourth Amendment concerns. 2t6
The possibilities of social media have proven to be extremely
tempting for law enforcement agencies. 264 Groups have
struggled to keep these government agencies at bay while
waiting for the law to catch up with technology.265
In January 2012, the online community reacted strongly
and swiftly to news of the Stop Online Piracy Act ("SOPA"), a
proposed bill that aimed to combat copyright infringement.2 66
Together with its counterpart, the Protect IP Act ("PIPA"), the
bill would restrict access to sites that host or facilitate the trading
of pirated material. 267 SOPA would potentially hold the
261. See Helft & Miller, supra note 57, at A1 ("Facebook told Newsweek in 2009 that
subpoenas and other orders were arrMing at the company at a rate of 10 to 20 a day.").
See generally Angwin, supra note 57, at Al (discussing the information requests made to
sites such as Facebook).
262. See Helft & Miller, supra note 57, at AI ("Concerned by the wave of requests
for customer data fr1om law enforcemcnt agencies, Google last year set up an online
tool showing the fiequency of these requests in various countries. In the first half of
2010, it counted more than 4,200 in the United States."). See generdally Angwin, supra
note 57. at Al (describing legal problems that have arisen benween ISPs and
government authorities).
263. See Angwin, supra note 57, at Al (discussing the issues that have arisen as
government agencies continue to make information requests); C(ohen, supra note 69, at
B3 (describing Twitter's response to information re(uess): Helft & Miller. supra note
57, at Al (reporting on the large number of information requests made by government
authorities).
264. See Angwin, supra note 57, at Al (explaining how law enforcement agencies
have used social media); Cohen, supra note 69, at B3 (detailing the way that Twitter has
responded to government requests for inoirmation); Helft & Miller, supra note 57, at
Al (discussing the large amount of requests foi information made by law enfoicement
authorities).
265. See Emergency Petition for Declaratory Ruling, supra note 255 (showing how
groups try to keep governmcntal authorities in check): see also Angiin, supra note 57, at
Al (detailing recent clashes between ISPs and government authorities).
266. Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261. 112th Cong. (2012): seeJulianne
Pepitone, SOPA Explained. What I Is and W/I It Matters, CNN MONLY (Jan. 20, 2012,
12:44 PM), http:/i money.c nn.com /21)12/01 /17/tech nolog /sopa-explainedi
index.htm (introducing the Stop Online Piracy Act ("SOPA").
267. PROTECT IP Act (PIPA), S.968, H.R. 3261, 1l2[h (ong. (2011); see
Pepitone, sapra note 266 (describing SOPA and the Protect IP Act (-PIPA")).
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operators of websites such as YouTube responsible for the
content that their users upload.268 Critics of SOPA and PIPA
stated that the bills were poorly written and would effectively
promote censorship.269 On January 18, 2012, popular internet
sites such as Wikipedia and Reddit shut down service for twenty-
four hours in protest, stating that the legislation was at odds with
freedom of speech rights and urging supporters to contact their
representatives. -7°) By the end of the day, several members of
Congress had withdrawn their support from the bills.2 71 Once
expected to quickly pass, SOPA and PIPA were effectively
grounded on January 20, 2012, when congressional leaders
postponed the vote, effectively shelving the bills.272
Initial development of the Internet led to the adoption of
specific internet norms and standards by international
organizations, engineering groups, and governmental
agencies. 273 In particular, freedom of expression and privacy
were norms that historically guided regulation of the Internet.274
As the Internet has spread, governments have struggled to react
to the growth of social media, leading to clashes between
268. See Pepitone, sp#ra note 266 (discussing the potential problems with SOPA);
John D. Sutter. I", Wikipedia Went Down at Vidnight. CNN (Jan. 18, 2012, 4:59 PM).
http://wN ,cnn.coi/2012/01/17/tech/web/wikipedia-sopa-blackout-qa/
index.htmPhpt-hp-cI (presenting an overview of the problems that websites had with
SOPA).
269. See Pepitone, supra note 266 (" [Opponents say that the way SOPA is written
elfectively promotes censorship and is rile with the potential for unintended
consequences."); see also Jonathan Weisman, Antipirac Bills Delayed After an Oli-e
Firestorn. N.Y. TIMLS, Jan. 21, 2012, at B6 (reporting on the problems posed by SOPA).
270. See Pepitone, i p,a note 266 (describing Wikipedia's protest); see also
Jonathan Weisman, Web Rises up to Deflect Bills Seen as Threat, N.Y. TrMFS, jan. 19, 2012,
at A1 (explaining the success of Wikipedia's approach to protesting SOPA and PIPA).
271. See Pepitone, supra note 266 (discussing the results of protest over SOPA); see
also Weisman, supra note 270, at Al (reporting on members of Congress who withdrew
their support foi the bills in the face of widespread criticism of the bill).
272. See Weisman, supra note 270, at Al (reporting on the results of internet
protests); see also Eric Morath & Geoftfey Fowler, Con ress Tosses Antipiray Bills. V¥AII
ST.J.,Jan. 21, 2012, ht): /online.wsj.com/article/SBl(t00142405297020430140457717
2703397383034.html (discussing the postponement of the votes on SOPA and I' PA).
273. See supra Part 1.2 (discussing the technological groups, international
organizations, and governmental agencies that crcatcd and adopted internet norms
and standards).
274. See supra Part 1.2 (describing the ways in which technological groups,
international organizations, and governmental agencies adopted privacy and freedom
of expression as internet norms).
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governments and established internet norms. 75 The Egyptian
revolution of early 2011 showed how people around the world
have the expectation that internet norms such as freedom of
expression will be respected, even if it is not a traditional norm
of the state. 27 The UK riots of August 2011 and the recent
development of the super-injunction illustrated the problems
governments face when trying to reconcile their own laws with
technological realities and the expectations of the international
community. 277 Finally, San Francisco's shutdown of mobile
service in August 2011, and concerns over the collection and
storage of personal data by the authorities in the United States,
demonstrates that the difficulties governments face when trying
to regulate social media are universal, and that a security
rationale is not a persuasive rationale when interfering with
social media.278
I1. GO MEPNMENTS MUST RESPECT ESTABLISHED
INTERNET NORMS WHEN REGULA7TING SOCIAL MEDIA
Governments must respect established internet norms such
as freedom of expression and privacy when attempting to
regulate social media. This Note argues that the security
rationale used by governments is not persuasive, as freedom of
expression and privacy concerns have consistently trumped
security considerations since the dawn of the Internet, especially
in the American context. While the rise of social media may
have amplified security concerns, the US government should
remain true to its initial objectives when formulating policy. This
Note concludes that rather than implementing policies that
interfere with social media as security threats arise, as in the
BART incident, the US government should try to craft policies
and legislation that work with the Internet.
275. See supra Part IILA (explaining recent clashes between the government and
established Internet norms in Egypt, the United Kingdom. and the United States).
276. See sup a notes 210-16 and accompanying text (describing the role that social
media played in the Fgyptian revolution).
277. See supra notes 231-46 (discussing recent clashes in the United Kingdom).
278. See supra notes 252-65 and accompanying text (describing debates over the
BART incident and data collection policies in the United States).
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As the Internet has become a pervasive part of peoples'
lives, governments have been forced to adapt quickly. 279
Governments around the world have struggled with responding
to new technology and have yet to establish a clear approach to
dealing with the capabilities of social media. 280 As a result,
govermnents have taken a haphazard approach, dealing with
situations as they arise.281 In some cases, this has lead to
disastrous results. 2112 When responding to incidents,
international governments have used a security rationale,
explaining that interference in social media is necessary to
preserve public safety. 283 The short history of the Internet,
however, has demonstrated that the security rationale is not
persuasive.28 4 While the initial architects of the Internet were
concerned with network security and the structural integrity of
the Internet, this concern did not extend to physical safety and
securityV. 5 Security, in the sense that governments attempt to
use it, is not an accepted internet norm. 286 Therefore,
279. See, e.g., supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text (describing the Egyptian
government's response to mass protests); supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text
(discussing the United Kingdom's attempt to shut down mobile service during riots);
supra notes 255-58 and accompanying text (explaining how groups in the US
responded to the BART incident).
280. See, e.g., supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text (discussing the Egyptian
govcrnments response to demonstrations); supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text
(describing the United Kingdom's contemplation of a mobile service shutdown); supra
notes 250-51 and accompanying text (explaining BART's reaction to demonstrations).
281. See, e.g., supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text (describing how the
Egyptian government dealt with mass protests); supra notes 241-42 and accompanying
text (discussing the United Kingdom's attempt to shut down mobile service during
riots); supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text (explaining how BART responded to
demonstrations).
282. See supra notes 211-16 and accompanying text (discussing the Egyptian
revolution).
283. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (explaining that the Egyptian
government shut down the Internet using a security rationalc); supra notes 243-46 and
accompanying text (noting that the British government had contemplated shutting
down the Internet in the luture in the interest of safety); supra note 254 and
accompanying text (discussing BART's assertion that their shutdown of cell service was
valid under a security-based undcrstanding).
284. See supra notes 186-95 and accompanying text (asserting that technological
groups and international organizations refer to network security and not physical
security as an established internet norm).
285. See supra notes 186-95 and accompanying text (discussing how the initial
architects of the Internet approached security questions).
286. See supra notes 186-95 and accompanying text (describing the way in which
technological and engineering groups discuss security).
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government attempts to rationalize internet interference as a
valid exercise of their police power will necessarily fail2 s7
As this Note has illustrated, in confrontations with internet-
related matters, internet norms have begun to trump traditional
government norms.28 While certain countries may hold vastly
different political and social values, the democratic character
and nature of the Internet has resulted in the expectation of
certain rights, regardless of international boundaries or
borders. 289 When governments try to assert their superiority,
they have been met with opposition, and were forced to either
retreat and lose face or take action and risk reaction. 290
Of the three countries discussed in this Note, Egypt is the
most extreme example of this phenomenon. 2- 1 Egypt was a
totalitarian state whose ruler was in power for thirty years.292
While Egypt had a democratic constitution, the imposition of
emergency law curtailed most human rights. 293 Freedom of
expression and privacy were not established as governmental
norms of the Egyptian state294 Yet, as internet use became more
287. See supra notes 210-15 and accompanying text (discussing the response to
the Egyptian government's move to shut down the Internet); supra notes 247-50 and
accompanying text (noting the criticism that erupted after Prime Minister Cameron
stated that in some cases social media regulation was warranted); supra notes 255-58
and accompanying text (describing the response to BART's shutdown of mobile service
in San Francisco).
288. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text (discussing Egypt as an
example of a countr where internet norms have trumped government norms).
289. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text (using Egypt as an example
when explaining that people around the world have begun to expect that internet
norms will be respected, even if they are not traditional values found in their
countries).
290. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text (describing how President
Mubarak was forced to step down alter weeks of protest); supra notes 245-46 and
accompanying text (discussing Prime Minister Cameiron's response to criticism after
proposing social media restrictions); supra notes 255-58 and accompanying text
(mentioning the response to BART's shutdown of mobile service in San Francisco).
291. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text (discussing the overthrow of
the Egyptian government and tihe stablishment of a new constitution).
292. See spra notes 200-10 and accompanying text (presenting a background of
policies tormed under tihe rule of tormer President Hosni Mubarak).
293. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text (describing the curtailment
ol many rights under emergency law in Egypt under the rule ol former President Hosni
Mubarak).
294. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (noting fl[at Egypt never respected
traditionally Western values such as freedom of expression and privacy).
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prevalent, these principles became expected. 295 For example,
the Egyptian youth developed expectations of privacy in their
homes.29-  They also demanded the right to be able to express
themselves, criticize the government, and demand change2 97
When an authoritarian state takes aggressive actions to control
its opponents it is a sign that the regime believes it faces a
threat2 98 The Egyptian government tried to exert control in the
way it had for the past three decades and discovered it could no
longer do so.29- Unable to match the diffusive power of the
Internet and social media sites, the govermnent reacted by
shutting them down.3°° This prohibitive action did not quell the
riots, however, and actually had the effect of inflaming them. 30 1
While the United Kingdom has a more established tradition
of freedom of expression and privacy rights compared to Egypt,
the understanding of these rights is very different than that in
the United States.3°2 The United Kingdom also has experienced
a clash of norms in recent months. 3°-3After 9/11, the United
Kingdom tightened security and increased surveillance
measures, relying heavily on a security rationale to justify their
actions. 4 Critics of the UK government's approach have called
it the realization of a "Big Brother" society.305 At the same time,
the country supported the events that occurred in Egypt and
295. See sura notes 202-05 and accompanying text (discussing Egyptians'
expectations of respect for internet normns).
296. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text (discussing the way internet
norms became expected by Egyptian citizens using the Internet).
297. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text (discussing tie ways in which
Egyptians camie to expect internet norls).
298. See supra notes 206-14 and accompanying text (asserting that the Egyptian
governments' response signaled its fear and confftsion towards the Internet).
299. See supra notes 206-16 and accompanying text (discussing tie Egyptian
government's response to protests and the subsequent overthrow of Hosni Mubarak).
300. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (tracing tihe governmcnt's reaction
to the protests).
30 1. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text (discussing the overthrow of
the Egyptian government and the establishment of a new constitution).
302. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (describing the different
understanding of certain rights in the United Kingdom).
303. See supra note 227 and accompanying text (introducing recent problems
Britain has taced).
304. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing new measures
adopted by the British governnent).
305. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (noting criticisms of the current
su eillance regime in the United Kingdom).
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other Middle Eastern nations during the "Arab Spring."1 °
Consequently, the UK govermnent faced charges of hypocrisy
after it contemplated restricting access to serv ices during the
riots in August 2011. 307 In addition, the flaws in the libel regime
of the United Kingdom have resulted in a haphazard approach
to governance. s The common law has been distorted as a result
of the lack of clear principles and now it must be addressed. ° 9
This Note contends that the United Kingdom should look to
established internet norms and standards in determining its
policy going forward. The confusing and often contradictory
laws of the nation are no longer reconcilable with the realities of
the Internet. Like Egypt, the United Kingdom must adapt to
new technology and the expectations that come with it.
The United States also has found itself in this precarious
position. 310 Freedom of expression and privacy are two
constitutional principles engrained in the American
consciousness.311 As a result, any interference with those rights
has been met not only with social but legal questions.31 2 The
public's response to SOPA and the subsequent reaction of
Congress is illustrative of the power of these norms.: 1  The US
government is no longer able to unilaterally define the
parameters of norms such as freedom of speech and privacy. 3 14
306. See supra note 245 and accompanying text (mentioning that the UK
government was criticized for proposing to adopt the same measures adopted by the
Egyptian government).
307. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text (noting criticism of the UK
governments calls to regulate social media).
308. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (discussing the problems in the
British libel regime and noting the need for reform).
309. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (noting the issues in British
libel regime).
310. See supra notes 246-52 and accompanying text (discussing the BART
shutdown of cell selvice in San Francisco).
311. See supra Part I.A. I and accompanying text (presenting the constitutional
underpinnings of the rights of fieedom to expression and privacy).
312. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text (explaining first amendment
issues concerning internet regulation); supra notes 58-78 and accompanying text
(describing Fourth Amendment issues and illustrating their application to internet
regulations).
313. See supra notes 266-72 and accompanying text (describing the successful
initiative undertaken by the public to prevent SOPA ftor being passed).
314. See supra notes 266-72 and accompanying text (discussing how the public
successfiuly relied on internet norms in opposing SOPA).
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Instead, the process has become truly democratic, as people are
able to shape the norms themselves? 15
This Note recommends that the US government should
respect internet norms when crafting legislation and policy. This
approach would be the most reconcilable with American
jurisprudence and also would help resolve the ongoing First and
Fourth Amendment issues. 316 The Supreme Court has
established that the government cannot restrict expression
because of its message, ideas, subject matter, or content.3 7
While there are exceptions where the government may use time,
place, and manner regulations to further significant
governmental interests, groups have continuously challenged
government attempts to regulate the Internet on First
Amendment grounds?18 Any government attempts to regulate
social media sites using a security rationale (claiming, for
example, that it is likely to incite imminent violence or will lead
reasonable people to fear violence) would similarly be criticized
and challenged. On the other hand, the internet community
would likely embrace an approach that favored transparency,
openness, and full disclosure.
Government inteivention poses a greater threat to fr-ee
speech than private action. At this point in time, the
government should act with restraint to prevent regulation that
could have unintended and farreaching consequences. The US
government should favor self-regulation approaches for the
Internet, with minimal or transparent government intervention.
Private intermediaries have played a vital role in internet
governance and should continue to do so in the future. -19
International groups, such as the WGIG, economic groups, such
as the OECD, and engineering groups, such as the IETF, all
315. See supra notes 266-72 and accompanying text (explaining how the publiCs
opposition to SOPA was elfective in helping to overcome it).
316. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing an example of the
ways US courts have approached these kinds of constitutional questions).
317. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (discussing the First
Amendment as it relates to internet regulation).
318. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (noting First Amendment
challenges that wvere made concerning legislation which sought to regulate internet
Content).
319. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
Section 230 of the CI)A in encouraging private action).
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possess expertise in the field., 320 They are therefore better
equipped than the government to deal with many of the
common issues that arise because they understand and respect
users' expectations. Putting regulation in the hands of
intermediaries allows multiple groups to work together to
determine their mutual best interests, solving problems that the
government is simply unable to solve. ",1 These groups add
inherent legitimacy to any actions taken and thus are best suited
to regulate the Internet when necessary.
The US government also should amend the ECPA to reflect
the current realities of communication on the Internet, using
established internet norms as a guide. While the US Supreme
Court has yet to decide whether a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their e-mail, the public has clearly
decided that communication over the Internet is here to stay. - 2
As e-mail and messaging services increasingly replace physical
mail, interest in their protection has increased accordingly. -2-
Meanwhile, the US government makes more and more requests
for information on individuals from ISPs such as Google..24
While some surveillance measures may be necessary for national
security, any internet regulation should be aimed at protecting
user privacy rather than expanding the government's power. -25
Internet privacy principles support the contention that a
substantial revision to the ECPA is warranted.3 26
320. See supra notes 138-43. 165-72 and accompanying text (describing the
dilerent organizations and the roles that they play in internet governance).
321. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (noting the importance of
technological organizations in developing the rules for network regulation).
322. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (describing lederal court cases
that have recently been decided concerning a personIs right to privacy in his or her e-
mail); supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (describing legislation pending in
Congress that seeks to update the laws that relate to internet technology).
323. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (describing federal court cases
that have recently been decided concerning a person's right to privacy in his or her e-
mail).
324. See supra notes 261-67 and accompanying text (discussing the increasing
number of requests tir personal intirmation made by government authorities and the
legal implications olfthese requests).
325. See supa notes 177-86 and accompanying text (explaining how certain
intLernet norms and standards have emerged and have been adopted and asserting that
these norms are those that should be respected by governments).
326. See supa notes 63-70 and accompanying text (criticizing the ECPA); sup a
notes 263-69 and accompanying text (discussing the need tor reorm concerning
personal data collection by government authorities).
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Until the law is able to catch up to technology, the US
government must tread lightly as it tries to determine its
appropriate role and the best way for it to protect the public.
This Note concludes that the government should look to
established internet norms such as openness, transparency, and
innovation when dealing with internet issues rather than relying
on a security rationale. This approach is consistent with existing
American jurisprudence and statutes. 327 Additionally, the US
government should look at users' expectations regarding the
established norms and standards. Fortunately, many third
parties already have systems in place to protect these
principles.3 2 The Internet provides a way for governments to
achieve many of their goals. 329 These governments must,
however, understand that they are now required to play by the
Internet's rules. The time when a government could impose
norms and principles without incurring a public reaction is past.
CONCL USION
Internet norms and standards have become accepted by
users around the world. As social media use has become
pervasive, people have grown to expect that certain norms will
be respected. For example, the people of Egypt used social
media sites to spread news, discuss their political opinions, and
organize protests. Although the freedoms of expression and
privacy have never been traditionally accepted norms of the
Egyptian state, the people demanded the acceptance of these
norms. Similarly, there was outrage in the United Kingdom and
the United States after government officials threatened to shut
down social media.
Governments, in turn, have responded with a security
rationale, arguing that they have the authority to act to protect
327. See supra notes 43-52, 57-59 and accompanying text (describing the
protections of the US (onstitution).
328. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (discussing the ways that
technological and engineering groups established principles and standards); supra
notes 151-54 (introducing the way international organizations use the norms of
fr eedom of expression, privacy, and transparency when formulating Internet
governance guidelines); supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text (describing how
governmental agencies in the United States have adopted these norns).
329. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (discussing ways law
enforcement agencies use information lound on social media sites).
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the public. Government authorities also have attempted to
argue that security is an established internet norm that it is
trying to protect. Recent events have proven this argument to be
unpersuasive. Vhile governments may have authority to act to
protect public safety, they must be careful to avoid excessive
responses. When attempting to regulate social media, the
government must act within accepted internet norms and
standards in order to maintain legitimacy in its actions.
